Abstract
In this essay I will be arguing about the patient not having any mental states. This starts off by summarizing and going into explanatory detail the argument of Type-Identity Theory held by doctor number one, and an artificial intelligence held by doctor number two, and why they do not make sense. This therefor leads the conclusion of rejecting the patient’s efficiency of mental states, in the view of acknowledgement of a type of functionalism more suitable than the perspectives spoke to by the specialists in the situation.
In this essay, what is being presented is an unusual situation which presents the mind-body problem. The patient (girl) who has sustained some sort of injuries, must have had her brain replaced by some sort …show more content…
The idea functionalism grips is that, “a mental state is defined by certain casual relations it bears to input states (sensory states), output states (verbal and nonverbal behaviors), and other mental states.” (Pete Mandik 109) This statement made by Mandik is an attempt to defeat Type-Identity Theory. Hilary Putnam, an American philosopher, mathematician, computer scientist, brought up what is known as the “multiple realizability” (Hilary Putnam) which is an essential argument that is advocating functionalism and the premise the portrays Hilary Putnam’s argument that “if the type-identity theory is true, a mental state of being in pain must be identical to certain physical-chemical state.” What is essential about this quote is that it tells us that we can find out two suggestions, both of which count against Type-Identity Theory and in favor of functionalism, which helps this essay talk about functionalism. Another idea which Hilary Putnam also states is that, “At the time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain” (Pete Mandik). What this is stating is that any creatures during this time must not have any physical state of the brain which they cannot feel. Pete Mandik explains and rewrites Hilary Putnam’s argument as two main suggestions, “the argument from actual multiple realizations”, and “the argument from possible multiple realizations.” (Mandik 114) The first suggestion is summarized conclusively by Pete Mandik by stating that “arguments from actual multiple realizations presume that there actually are creatures that have some of the same mental states as humans.” (Mandik 114) This premise by Pete Mandik shows that the Type-Identity Theory would not be in place, but them isn’t any conclusive evidence in the article which tell us this, which makes the
In this essay I will be arguing about the patient not having any mental states. This starts off by summarizing and going into explanatory detail the argument of Type-Identity Theory held by doctor number one, and an artificial intelligence held by doctor number two, and why they do not make sense. This therefor leads the conclusion of rejecting the patient’s efficiency of mental states, in the view of acknowledgement of a type of functionalism more suitable than the perspectives spoke to by the specialists in the situation.
In this essay, what is being presented is an unusual situation which presents the mind-body problem. The patient (girl) who has sustained some sort of injuries, must have had her brain replaced by some sort …show more content…
The idea functionalism grips is that, “a mental state is defined by certain casual relations it bears to input states (sensory states), output states (verbal and nonverbal behaviors), and other mental states.” (Pete Mandik 109) This statement made by Mandik is an attempt to defeat Type-Identity Theory. Hilary Putnam, an American philosopher, mathematician, computer scientist, brought up what is known as the “multiple realizability” (Hilary Putnam) which is an essential argument that is advocating functionalism and the premise the portrays Hilary Putnam’s argument that “if the type-identity theory is true, a mental state of being in pain must be identical to certain physical-chemical state.” What is essential about this quote is that it tells us that we can find out two suggestions, both of which count against Type-Identity Theory and in favor of functionalism, which helps this essay talk about functionalism. Another idea which Hilary Putnam also states is that, “At the time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain” (Pete Mandik). What this is stating is that any creatures during this time must not have any physical state of the brain which they cannot feel. Pete Mandik explains and rewrites Hilary Putnam’s argument as two main suggestions, “the argument from actual multiple realizations”, and “the argument from possible multiple realizations.” (Mandik 114) The first suggestion is summarized conclusively by Pete Mandik by stating that “arguments from actual multiple realizations presume that there actually are creatures that have some of the same mental states as humans.” (Mandik 114) This premise by Pete Mandik shows that the Type-Identity Theory would not be in place, but them isn’t any conclusive evidence in the article which tell us this, which makes the