European powers during the Opium and Sino-French wars, and then again during the
Sino-Japanese war, China’s longtime status as regional hegemon had come to an end.
By the end of World War II, China was already undergoing a profound process of internal change, and disengaged to a large extent from the international arena, particularly as its civil war intensified. In 1949, the Communists finally prevailed, and the remaining Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Only four years prior, the Allied victory over Japan saw a dual American-Soviet occupation of the Korean Peninsula, leading to the North-South divide along the 38th parallel and the establishment of two separate
Korean states. The character of the respective states reflected the influence …show more content…
While North Korea adopted a strategy of exploiting the eventual rift between China and the USSR, playing the communist powers off each other to secure more favorable economic concessions, the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War had a strong adverse impact on the Kim Regime. It had lost one of its key economic and diplomatic patrons and found itself, in ideological terms, increasingly an outlier. To a significant extent, China filled the vacuum left by the Soviets. China, however, was transitioning to a different economic model, marked in particular by its opening up to foreign trade in the early 1980s and its pivot to certain free-market principles. Rather than following suit, Pyongyang set out on a different tack in its navigation of the new post-Cold War paradigm -- it turned its attention to heavy militarization. A powerful military could be
1 With over a million in reserve behind the Yalu River
7
used as leverage to extract concessions from neighboring states, the Americans, and others concerned with the political precariousness of the peninsula and its potential …show more content…
While the influx of foreign capital is desperately needed, the Kim regime appears resentful of its position vis-a-vis Beijing, and especially of its concession of Korean natural resources to Chinese industrialists. There is considerable resentment on the
Chinese side as well, whose projects and investments are subject to the DPRK’s notorious unpredictability. Aware of China’s prioritization of stability on the peninsula, and its concerns about the DPRK initiating unprovoked conflict, Pyongyang leverages its instability to exercise some minor but evident control over Beijing, which is a major stakeholder in the future of the Korean peninsula.
China also has deep concerns as to how a DPRK collapse would impact the strategic balance in East Asia. In such a scenario, a Korean reunification would enjoy broad international support and, if realized, the PRC would be faced with a US-aligned, potentially nuclear-armed power at its door, notwithstanding Beijing’s strong trade and diplomatic ties to Seoul. Should Pyongyang initiate conflict, which it has regularly threatened to do, it would likely draw the Americans, South Koreans, and the
Sino-Japanese war, China’s longtime status as regional hegemon had come to an end.
By the end of World War II, China was already undergoing a profound process of internal change, and disengaged to a large extent from the international arena, particularly as its civil war intensified. In 1949, the Communists finally prevailed, and the remaining Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Only four years prior, the Allied victory over Japan saw a dual American-Soviet occupation of the Korean Peninsula, leading to the North-South divide along the 38th parallel and the establishment of two separate
Korean states. The character of the respective states reflected the influence …show more content…
While North Korea adopted a strategy of exploiting the eventual rift between China and the USSR, playing the communist powers off each other to secure more favorable economic concessions, the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War had a strong adverse impact on the Kim Regime. It had lost one of its key economic and diplomatic patrons and found itself, in ideological terms, increasingly an outlier. To a significant extent, China filled the vacuum left by the Soviets. China, however, was transitioning to a different economic model, marked in particular by its opening up to foreign trade in the early 1980s and its pivot to certain free-market principles. Rather than following suit, Pyongyang set out on a different tack in its navigation of the new post-Cold War paradigm -- it turned its attention to heavy militarization. A powerful military could be
1 With over a million in reserve behind the Yalu River
7
used as leverage to extract concessions from neighboring states, the Americans, and others concerned with the political precariousness of the peninsula and its potential …show more content…
While the influx of foreign capital is desperately needed, the Kim regime appears resentful of its position vis-a-vis Beijing, and especially of its concession of Korean natural resources to Chinese industrialists. There is considerable resentment on the
Chinese side as well, whose projects and investments are subject to the DPRK’s notorious unpredictability. Aware of China’s prioritization of stability on the peninsula, and its concerns about the DPRK initiating unprovoked conflict, Pyongyang leverages its instability to exercise some minor but evident control over Beijing, which is a major stakeholder in the future of the Korean peninsula.
China also has deep concerns as to how a DPRK collapse would impact the strategic balance in East Asia. In such a scenario, a Korean reunification would enjoy broad international support and, if realized, the PRC would be faced with a US-aligned, potentially nuclear-armed power at its door, notwithstanding Beijing’s strong trade and diplomatic ties to Seoul. Should Pyongyang initiate conflict, which it has regularly threatened to do, it would likely draw the Americans, South Koreans, and the