Using a variety of academic literature, this paper finds that Putin’s strategy of co-opting Ramzan Kadyrov and allowing him almost autocratic rule over Chechnya only served to stabilize the conflict in the short term. Drawing on peacebuilding literature, this paper argues that the strategy of chechenization has stagnated further progress towards peace in Chechnya and has failed to address simmering ethnic, religious and nationalist tensions. In sum, the long term costs of chechenization for both Chechnya and Russia far outweigh its short term …show more content…
By 1994, Russian forces had invaded Chechnya, beginning the first Russo-Chechen war. Miriam Matejova characterizes this war as a “‘war of communist secession’ as its outbreak was triggered by the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.” The war resulted in a stalemate, with Chechen rebels and Russian military rebels signing the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement, which was then followed by a formal peace treaty between President Boris Yeltsin and the Chechen president at the time, Aslan Maskhadov. Three years later, when Chechen rebels attempted to create an Islamic state in the North Caucasus, Russian forces once again attacked