Thus, on one hand, we find that dogmatic monotheism proclaims God to be the one true God among many false deities. On this level “the true, authentic God, teaches the Old Testament, is always just the unique, he who is unique”. Hence, the plurality of false deities stands opposed to the one true God. On the other hand, if we understand philosophically the notion of God, we cannot but conclude that all representations of God are manifestations of the same reality. This, follows because the concept of the “capital ‘G’” God includes his oneness. Hence, he cannot be opposed to other deities insofar as he is not on the same level as them. Quoting John of Damascus, Schelling claims that God is more than just unique, but rather “over-unique”. Subsequently,
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According to the German philosopher, for two things to be described as equals, we must hold them to have something in common. At the very least, they must share pure being. However, if God as presented in the dogma is that being which has no equal, the one who is even above the other deities, then he does not share his being with anything. In this respect, God “[…] cannot be a being. […] But if God is not a being, something that just participates in being, then he cannot be but being itself”. Hence, being itself is “[…] the preliminary and necessary concept of God, that we must posit in order to posit God (and not: a god). Therefore, God is being itself. But to be being itself is not his divinity, but rather the presupposition of his divinity”. Thus, the concept of God from a negative point of view includes oneness, which becomes the presupposition of any manifestation of God. Crucially, God is not a one as opposed to a plurality, as it would be in the dogmatic context. Instead, God 's oneness escapes the dichotomy between the one and the many. This follows because if God is being itself, then all entities participate fundamentally in him as the source of their being. Thus, he is what gives ground and precedes the relationship between the one and the many, insofar as he is the source of the elements of this opposition. Hence, God is one in an absolute sense, and because of that he grounds the possibility of there being a one in a relative sense, namely as opposed to the
According to the German philosopher, for two things to be described as equals, we must hold them to have something in common. At the very least, they must share pure being. However, if God as presented in the dogma is that being which has no equal, the one who is even above the other deities, then he does not share his being with anything. In this respect, God “[…] cannot be a being. […] But if God is not a being, something that just participates in being, then he cannot be but being itself”. Hence, being itself is “[…] the preliminary and necessary concept of God, that we must posit in order to posit God (and not: a god). Therefore, God is being itself. But to be being itself is not his divinity, but rather the presupposition of his divinity”. Thus, the concept of God from a negative point of view includes oneness, which becomes the presupposition of any manifestation of God. Crucially, God is not a one as opposed to a plurality, as it would be in the dogmatic context. Instead, God 's oneness escapes the dichotomy between the one and the many. This follows because if God is being itself, then all entities participate fundamentally in him as the source of their being. Thus, he is what gives ground and precedes the relationship between the one and the many, insofar as he is the source of the elements of this opposition. Hence, God is one in an absolute sense, and because of that he grounds the possibility of there being a one in a relative sense, namely as opposed to the