The term “supranationalism” can be defined as “a view that emphasizes the common good or goals of the EU as opposed to the separate interests of the member states” …show more content…
The European Union’s success regarding supranationalism can be attributed to the Union’s prosperities that have been achieved over time. For example, the European Union has achieved economic interdependence, a reduction of tariffs and the adoption of the Euro through member states in the Union all working collectively to achieve these goals. Of the major institutions in the European Union, both the European Commission and European Court of Justice tend to operate supranationally (Olsen et al., 2017). The European Commission upholds as well as manifests the common interest of the European Union. The Commission is made up of representatives appointed by their respective member state governments and they also have to be approved by the European Parliament. Known officially as Members of the College of Commissioners, these members are responsible for acts such as introducing legislation and implementing budgets and programs adopted by …show more content…
With these two contrasting systems in place, power in the European Union and among member states stays more balanced. With supranationalism, decisions are being made in the Union independent of national governments, focusing more on a higher authority which is the European Union in this case (Olsen et al., 2017). On the other hand, with regards to intergovernmentalism, decisions are being made between governments and their heads of state in the European Union rather than by representatives of those member states. Although both the representatives and national governments serve different roles and purposes in systems that operate supranationally and intergovernmentally, these two systems maintain a balance of power between the two in order for neither to have too much power. If either the European Union or the singular member states had too much power, then it could plausibly be argued that order would be lost. If the Union had a virtual abundance of power among the states, then the interests of single states would be at stake. Conversely, if states had an abundance of power compared to the Union, then the common interests of Europe as a consecutive whole could be said to be at stake. As a result, it is important that these two systems are in place in the context of the European