However, the facts of the two cases are so completely different that the court should have gone further in its analysis and relied on other sources of law. Wright dealt with a residency requirement for municipal employment. Thus, it was by any definition a “right to travel” case. It implicated the right to move and live where one wishes. It made sense for Wright to rely heavily on interstate travel precedent of Shapiro and Dunn, because those cases also dealt with durational residency requirements that implicated the exact same right to move and live where one wishes. Dickerson, meanwhile, presented a completely different factual context. The Dickerson Court should have recognized that the right to cross the bridge to escape a disaster was not the same “travel” right that was implicated in Shapiro, Dunn, or
However, the facts of the two cases are so completely different that the court should have gone further in its analysis and relied on other sources of law. Wright dealt with a residency requirement for municipal employment. Thus, it was by any definition a “right to travel” case. It implicated the right to move and live where one wishes. It made sense for Wright to rely heavily on interstate travel precedent of Shapiro and Dunn, because those cases also dealt with durational residency requirements that implicated the exact same right to move and live where one wishes. Dickerson, meanwhile, presented a completely different factual context. The Dickerson Court should have recognized that the right to cross the bridge to escape a disaster was not the same “travel” right that was implicated in Shapiro, Dunn, or