In their 1985 work The Dialectical Biologist, authors Levins and Lewontin make the case for a dialectical-perspective-based approach to scientific inquiry and interpretation. Here we first summarize what is more rigorously referred to as the dialectical materialist (DM) perspective (Clark & York, 2005), then illustrate how science and social epidemiology (SE) fits within the framework developed therein. Next, we compare our own application of the dialectic framework to SE to the approach laid out in the authors’ own discussion on SE in Chapter 12, Research Needs for Latin Community Health. The purpose of the latter analysis is multifold: first, we aim to examine what might be gained by seeking a more holistic approach in the field; second,
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This view enters from Marxist theory of human history, where well-ordered historical stages create the successor stage as a direct consequence of the internal forces present within each stage (p86). The complexity of interaction within the parts of a whole are not, however, limited to within the ecological world. The social world, and within that the human endeavor to interrogate the natural world, are also bounded by the same laws of inseparability. The apparent paradox set up here, is how can one study anything at all without contaminating any measurement? Can it even be done? The answer, of course, is yes*; however, the caveat being that the results of said research may only be applicable so far as the four walls of the experiment; importantly this is not to say that either 1) the conclusions are not necessarily more generally true/applicable, or, less usefully, 2) similarly specific circumstances, may yield the opposite results (Fig 4.1, p115-6). Examples of areas in which such apparent contradictions may arise might be anything from the embryonic development of a genotype in a small temperature range to the influence of …show more content…
Secondly, an important line-of-thought follows directly: is there is any sort of underlying truth at all. The authors note that although there are thought to be “fundamental constants” of the/our universe, there is no way to know if the mass of the electron or Planck’s constant have always been the same or will necessarily be in the future (p268). These concerns, although perhaps extreme in the cases just mentioned, fit within the dialectic mindset as all perceived constants must be examined, or at least first considered, as variables. A more subtle question along the same lines asks if the measurement is measuring something only very specifically true or more generally applicable. In order to estimate the applicability of an experimental result to a broader context, one needs to establish a proposed mechanistic model. Importantly, as mentioned earlier, the essential feature of this model is that the variables that might be changing between the specific experimental environment and any given environment must be evaluated in order to assess the more generalizability. Such variables might include temperature & other environmental variables, genotypes, phenotypes, social environment, etc., but are really limitless. It stands to reason
This view enters from Marxist theory of human history, where well-ordered historical stages create the successor stage as a direct consequence of the internal forces present within each stage (p86). The complexity of interaction within the parts of a whole are not, however, limited to within the ecological world. The social world, and within that the human endeavor to interrogate the natural world, are also bounded by the same laws of inseparability. The apparent paradox set up here, is how can one study anything at all without contaminating any measurement? Can it even be done? The answer, of course, is yes*; however, the caveat being that the results of said research may only be applicable so far as the four walls of the experiment; importantly this is not to say that either 1) the conclusions are not necessarily more generally true/applicable, or, less usefully, 2) similarly specific circumstances, may yield the opposite results (Fig 4.1, p115-6). Examples of areas in which such apparent contradictions may arise might be anything from the embryonic development of a genotype in a small temperature range to the influence of …show more content…
Secondly, an important line-of-thought follows directly: is there is any sort of underlying truth at all. The authors note that although there are thought to be “fundamental constants” of the/our universe, there is no way to know if the mass of the electron or Planck’s constant have always been the same or will necessarily be in the future (p268). These concerns, although perhaps extreme in the cases just mentioned, fit within the dialectic mindset as all perceived constants must be examined, or at least first considered, as variables. A more subtle question along the same lines asks if the measurement is measuring something only very specifically true or more generally applicable. In order to estimate the applicability of an experimental result to a broader context, one needs to establish a proposed mechanistic model. Importantly, as mentioned earlier, the essential feature of this model is that the variables that might be changing between the specific experimental environment and any given environment must be evaluated in order to assess the more generalizability. Such variables might include temperature & other environmental variables, genotypes, phenotypes, social environment, etc., but are really limitless. It stands to reason