INTRODUCTION
Timing was critical for the conduct and success of both Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Diplomacy made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to reconcile many of their differences after forty-five years of the cold-war….but it is unable to bridge the differences between President George H.W. Bush and Saddam Hussein over Kuwait. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on incorrect information−about weapons of mass destruction and a supposed nexus between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda’s terrorism−and then occupied the country negligently. Desert Storm provides an example of an administration that attempted to use their diplomatic power, while Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the …show more content…
As stated in the introduction, it was solely based on incorrect information concerning whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On December 2, 2001, General Tommy Franks briefed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that he was concerned that Iraq was possibly a terrorist’s safe haven and could be prone for the potential use of WMD. Frank specifically asked the secretary if removing Saddam Hussein regime from Iraq was the correct objective, and he also sought and received confirmation that the key mission requirements would include ending Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbors with either conventional forces or WMD. The sad truth is that diplomacy is not being given a chance to …show more content…
Government made three mistakes in handling the end of the 1991 war. First, it encouraged the Shiites and Kurds to rebel, but didn’t support them, Second, the U.S. government assumed that Saddam’s regime was so damaged that his fall was inevitable, and Third, the U.S. military didn’t undercut the core of Saddam Hussein’s power. Much of his army, especially elite Republican Guard units, were allowed to leave Kuwait relatively untouched. However, for OIF, maybe if Bush would had acted on the advice of poor intelligence on WMD, which continues to haunt troops in the field−and, arguably, helped arm and protect the insurgency that would emerge in the following
Timing was critical for the conduct and success of both Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Diplomacy made it possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to reconcile many of their differences after forty-five years of the cold-war….but it is unable to bridge the differences between President George H.W. Bush and Saddam Hussein over Kuwait. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was based on incorrect information−about weapons of mass destruction and a supposed nexus between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda’s terrorism−and then occupied the country negligently. Desert Storm provides an example of an administration that attempted to use their diplomatic power, while Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is the …show more content…
As stated in the introduction, it was solely based on incorrect information concerning whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On December 2, 2001, General Tommy Franks briefed Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that he was concerned that Iraq was possibly a terrorist’s safe haven and could be prone for the potential use of WMD. Frank specifically asked the secretary if removing Saddam Hussein regime from Iraq was the correct objective, and he also sought and received confirmation that the key mission requirements would include ending Iraq’s capacity to threaten its neighbors with either conventional forces or WMD. The sad truth is that diplomacy is not being given a chance to …show more content…
Government made three mistakes in handling the end of the 1991 war. First, it encouraged the Shiites and Kurds to rebel, but didn’t support them, Second, the U.S. government assumed that Saddam’s regime was so damaged that his fall was inevitable, and Third, the U.S. military didn’t undercut the core of Saddam Hussein’s power. Much of his army, especially elite Republican Guard units, were allowed to leave Kuwait relatively untouched. However, for OIF, maybe if Bush would had acted on the advice of poor intelligence on WMD, which continues to haunt troops in the field−and, arguably, helped arm and protect the insurgency that would emerge in the following