IST, Science, and Beliefs
Dennett now proceeds to place IST within cognitive science. He believes that IST could lead to some unification amongst the sciences, due to its ability to properly sort a number of thorny philosophical issues (such as if the system really has beliefs). By example, he notes how intentional systems regard beliefs. IST states that beliefs serve no purpose unless those beliefs are mostly true. A system containing many false beliefs fails to even be conceivable. An optimally designed intentional systems tends to believe truths more than falsities, and, when possible, avows the aforementioned beliefs.
Dennet asks how observers treat intentional systems. Accordingly, he claims that observers begin by ascribing goals …show more content…
They need not be actual (“belief” may be a metaphor). Rather, it is appropriate to assign the system goals and the possession of information; there need not be any anthropomorphizing of the system. Furthermore, the intentional stance does little in answering design questions, as the former is concerned with normative principles, and the latter is not (and it presupposes intentionality).
Regarding the contention between Brandom and Dennett, I see little to suggest that there is an incompatibility. Dennett is interested in explaining why it is useful to treat some systems as intentional, and Brandom is concerned with how meaning arises. Dennett is forthright in admitting that IST presupposes intentionality, and so I don't believe there are conflicting explanations here. Dennett makes no mention of communities, but he is also not trying to determine if there is really meaning behind an intentional system's behavior. IST is squarely considering all intentionality on an “as if” …show more content…
First, Brandom’s rather confusing discussion of “internal sanctions” in Chapter 1 of MIE. Second, Heath’s unwillingness to accept the idea that pretty much the whole of MIE‘s argument is required in order to cash out the content of some of the book’s early categories.Heath is frustrated that an account of the nature of normative practices – an account of what makes such practices distinctively normative – is not forthcoming in the book’s first chapter. Without such an account, Heath argues, the apparatus of MIE is built on non-naturalistic axiomatic foundations in a way that removes much of its potential explanatory power. Were Heath right in his analysis of the structure of MIE‘s argument, this would indeed be a serious problem. My claim, however, is that MIE‘s argument as a whole functions as precisely the explanation of what makes normative practices normative, that Heath thinks is missing from the book’s first
Dennett now proceeds to place IST within cognitive science. He believes that IST could lead to some unification amongst the sciences, due to its ability to properly sort a number of thorny philosophical issues (such as if the system really has beliefs). By example, he notes how intentional systems regard beliefs. IST states that beliefs serve no purpose unless those beliefs are mostly true. A system containing many false beliefs fails to even be conceivable. An optimally designed intentional systems tends to believe truths more than falsities, and, when possible, avows the aforementioned beliefs.
Dennet asks how observers treat intentional systems. Accordingly, he claims that observers begin by ascribing goals …show more content…
They need not be actual (“belief” may be a metaphor). Rather, it is appropriate to assign the system goals and the possession of information; there need not be any anthropomorphizing of the system. Furthermore, the intentional stance does little in answering design questions, as the former is concerned with normative principles, and the latter is not (and it presupposes intentionality).
Regarding the contention between Brandom and Dennett, I see little to suggest that there is an incompatibility. Dennett is interested in explaining why it is useful to treat some systems as intentional, and Brandom is concerned with how meaning arises. Dennett is forthright in admitting that IST presupposes intentionality, and so I don't believe there are conflicting explanations here. Dennett makes no mention of communities, but he is also not trying to determine if there is really meaning behind an intentional system's behavior. IST is squarely considering all intentionality on an “as if” …show more content…
First, Brandom’s rather confusing discussion of “internal sanctions” in Chapter 1 of MIE. Second, Heath’s unwillingness to accept the idea that pretty much the whole of MIE‘s argument is required in order to cash out the content of some of the book’s early categories.Heath is frustrated that an account of the nature of normative practices – an account of what makes such practices distinctively normative – is not forthcoming in the book’s first chapter. Without such an account, Heath argues, the apparatus of MIE is built on non-naturalistic axiomatic foundations in a way that removes much of its potential explanatory power. Were Heath right in his analysis of the structure of MIE‘s argument, this would indeed be a serious problem. My claim, however, is that MIE‘s argument as a whole functions as precisely the explanation of what makes normative practices normative, that Heath thinks is missing from the book’s first