In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Polemarchus debate the assertion “it is just to give to each what is owed to him,” that Simonides originally theorized. The postulation develops from Cephalus’ prior claim that a just man is one who “speaks the truth and repays his debts” (331d). Socrates undermines Cephalus’ definition of justice by proposing a scenario wherein a madman lends a sword to a friend, and the friend may either return the weapon or keep it from the obviously dangerous individual. Socrates concludes that returning the weapon, which would be the “just” action according to Cephalus because it constitutes honest repayment, is unjust. In his debate with Polemarchus, Socrates once again critiques the proposed relationship between
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These analogies relate justice to professions and animals in an attempt to refine the definition Socrates seeks. Socrates ultimately comes to the conclusion that justice cannot be “to give each what is owed to him.” Socrates and Polemarchus both agree that because it is never just to hurt another man, to give each man--be he good or bad--what he “owes” is fundamentally unjust. The philosopher is closer to a definition of justice because he can reject Polemarchus’ assertion as a potential answer to the query “what is justice?” However, I take issue with Socrates’ theory of justice as a craft, and further, the idea that hurting another is never just on account of Socrates’ weak analogies and vague …show more content…
Following Socrates’ contention that Simonides would side with Cephalus and return a weapon to a madman, Polemarchus narrows his definition of justice, by claiming that justice is to give each what they deserve or is “appropriate to him.” Further, when prompted by Socrates, Polemarchus claims that medicine lends, or “gives medicine, food and health to bodies” (332c) and cooking gives seasoning to meat. Thus, Polemarchus comes to the conclusion that justice must give or “owe” what is good to friends and what is bad to enemies. Socrates then asks his interlocutor which profession or craft is most just in its treatment of others. He claims that, for example, a doctor will treat a sick patient with more skill than a just man, and conversely, be more adept at harming a patient, if he “deserves bad.” Polemarchus replies that justice is useful in war and peacetime only when it protects objects or money, otherwise a skillful man is preferred. Thus, Socrates concludes that if justice is a craft, it is “only useful for useless things,” such as watching money or a lyre. Furthermore, Polemarchus’ first premise, is critiqued by Plato on the grounds that (1) if justice is a craft, a more skilled individual is more equipped to “give what is owed” than a just one, and (2) that Polemarchus’ argument reduces justice to
These analogies relate justice to professions and animals in an attempt to refine the definition Socrates seeks. Socrates ultimately comes to the conclusion that justice cannot be “to give each what is owed to him.” Socrates and Polemarchus both agree that because it is never just to hurt another man, to give each man--be he good or bad--what he “owes” is fundamentally unjust. The philosopher is closer to a definition of justice because he can reject Polemarchus’ assertion as a potential answer to the query “what is justice?” However, I take issue with Socrates’ theory of justice as a craft, and further, the idea that hurting another is never just on account of Socrates’ weak analogies and vague …show more content…
Following Socrates’ contention that Simonides would side with Cephalus and return a weapon to a madman, Polemarchus narrows his definition of justice, by claiming that justice is to give each what they deserve or is “appropriate to him.” Further, when prompted by Socrates, Polemarchus claims that medicine lends, or “gives medicine, food and health to bodies” (332c) and cooking gives seasoning to meat. Thus, Polemarchus comes to the conclusion that justice must give or “owe” what is good to friends and what is bad to enemies. Socrates then asks his interlocutor which profession or craft is most just in its treatment of others. He claims that, for example, a doctor will treat a sick patient with more skill than a just man, and conversely, be more adept at harming a patient, if he “deserves bad.” Polemarchus replies that justice is useful in war and peacetime only when it protects objects or money, otherwise a skillful man is preferred. Thus, Socrates concludes that if justice is a craft, it is “only useful for useless things,” such as watching money or a lyre. Furthermore, Polemarchus’ first premise, is critiqued by Plato on the grounds that (1) if justice is a craft, a more skilled individual is more equipped to “give what is owed” than a just one, and (2) that Polemarchus’ argument reduces justice to