This paper is based on varied literature including journal articles, research papers, online resources, edited books, etc. The main focus of this paper is to examine the UK courts procedure in relation to the concept of deference with regards section 3 and section 4 of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, it’s limitations and the essence of judicial deference to legislation and the interference of Parliamentary supremacy. In addition, it would be potent to highlight ‘the judicial approach to the scheme of the HRA particularly the interpretation and application of the interpretive obligation laid down in s 3 and the power to declare legislation incompatible under s4 as well as the construction by the judiciary of a principle of deference’ …show more content…
In addition, despite the preliminary scepticism, it can be seen that the HRA’s protection of rights extended to the protection of asylum-seekers, gay and transsexual individuals, terrorist suspects and other groups in jeopardy, which have been assisted from the judgements, made in their favour.
Limitations
Edwards points out that though deference may have a role to play in a branch of the proportionality test, as a general principle the circumstantial perspective of the judiciary at this stage of the said test would not be adequate as a practice of its standard implementation.
The most detrimental form of deference is where the judicature adopts it at the pre-limitation stage. This is illustrated in Poplar Housing , the Court of Appeal empowered the s21(4) Housing Act 1996 which authorized the eviction of the defendant, which essentially intervened with Article 8(1) right to home life.
Conclusion
Of the 18 cases that have declared incompatible, on 17 have resulted in amendments of change to the legislation.
Among the 17 cases, which resulted in changes to the legislation, arguably only 8 were associated with the dialogue procedure between the judicature, legislature and the