First, the key cause of the disaster was an overconfidence bias. This bias refers to a tendency to assume the certainty of accuracy about estimations and predictions (Davies, 2003). By using judgmental heuristics, or shortcuts, information-process demands are reduced, which increase opportunities for mistakes (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). Employees became comfortable in their routine and fell into complacency. However, the assigning of a simple naysayer may have caused assumptions to be reexamined (Davies, 2003).
Next, leadership’s wrong decision-making style played a part in the disaster. With a high need for safety, an analytical decision-making style would have been very beneficial. In an analytical style of decision making, there is a high focus on the task and technical concerns, a high tolerance for ambiguity or the unknown, decisions are made carefully, and decision makers respond well to new or uncertain situations (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). With 20 anomalies listed in the disaster, the outcome may have been different with a …show more content…
Communication may have been hindered due to low minority dissent. Minority dissent measures the degree to which team members are comfortable disagreeing with others; participation levels in decisions are measured as well (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). In turn, the team could have benefited largely from the Delphi technique when problem-solving. This way, ideas are generated anonymously, conflicts or disagreements that would have hindered communication are avoided, and it allows equal participation (Kreitner & Kinicki,