reports of complaints due to exposure to the smoke (Lewis, 1994). Luckily the smoke rose straight up and was dispersed high enough into the atmosphere. The fire departments came prepared due to previous trainings at the Shell facility. The quick evacuation of the one mile surrounding area was also noted as being instrumental in keeping the exposure levels of citizens to a minimum (Hunt, 2016).
The next thing that was miscommunicated over the next few days following the incident were the levels of environmental contamination. Ron Lewis of the Parkersburg News and Sentinel reported that the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) and Shell Chemical Company spokesman Rob Berger said that nothing from the fire fighter’s water sprayings made …show more content…
The employees at Shell had thought that the containment set up on Decker’s Creek, a tributary to the Ohio River, was sufficient to prevent the release of ethylene di-bromide into the River. A plume of ethylene di-bromide was discovered in Huntington, West Virginia which is roughly 90 miles downstream of the plant. The plume was measured at the 54 hour mark of release to be 32 miles long (Price, 1994). The Ohio EPA required intensive sampling up and down the plume as it traveled down the river. The levels recorded in Ironton, Ohio which is just south of Huntington were at 0.08 parts per billion (ppb). The long term exposure limit that is allowed for ethylene di-bromide is 0.05 ppb. Even though the exposure would not likely cause any harm, the cities involved were provided barges or clean drinking water to use instead of pulling supply directly from the river. The chemical could not be boiled out of the water resulting in the need for barges until the levels lowered (Price, …show more content…
The plant had no back up capacity for production of these compounds. The explosion resulted in the shut-down of both divisions. The Kraton G section was damaged from the fire and shockwave of the explosion. The Kraton D section of the plant was where the explosion originated and resulted in massive damage to the unit. The repairs to the Kraton G unit lasted about a year. The Kraton D unit took two years to renovate (Shell to Start). This was an inopportune time to lose production capabilities. The TPE polymer market had expanded 35% the year before (Blast Shuts Shell’s). Shell did not have any back up plan to fulfill contracts that were negotiated. Shell was forced to declare force majeure due to its crisis. Shell learned from this process and implemented a new system in the renovation to insure that processes could be shifted in the case of another emergency (Crews Find Missing
The next thing that was miscommunicated over the next few days following the incident were the levels of environmental contamination. Ron Lewis of the Parkersburg News and Sentinel reported that the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) and Shell Chemical Company spokesman Rob Berger said that nothing from the fire fighter’s water sprayings made …show more content…
The employees at Shell had thought that the containment set up on Decker’s Creek, a tributary to the Ohio River, was sufficient to prevent the release of ethylene di-bromide into the River. A plume of ethylene di-bromide was discovered in Huntington, West Virginia which is roughly 90 miles downstream of the plant. The plume was measured at the 54 hour mark of release to be 32 miles long (Price, 1994). The Ohio EPA required intensive sampling up and down the plume as it traveled down the river. The levels recorded in Ironton, Ohio which is just south of Huntington were at 0.08 parts per billion (ppb). The long term exposure limit that is allowed for ethylene di-bromide is 0.05 ppb. Even though the exposure would not likely cause any harm, the cities involved were provided barges or clean drinking water to use instead of pulling supply directly from the river. The chemical could not be boiled out of the water resulting in the need for barges until the levels lowered (Price, …show more content…
The plant had no back up capacity for production of these compounds. The explosion resulted in the shut-down of both divisions. The Kraton G section was damaged from the fire and shockwave of the explosion. The Kraton D section of the plant was where the explosion originated and resulted in massive damage to the unit. The repairs to the Kraton G unit lasted about a year. The Kraton D unit took two years to renovate (Shell to Start). This was an inopportune time to lose production capabilities. The TPE polymer market had expanded 35% the year before (Blast Shuts Shell’s). Shell did not have any back up plan to fulfill contracts that were negotiated. Shell was forced to declare force majeure due to its crisis. Shell learned from this process and implemented a new system in the renovation to insure that processes could be shifted in the case of another emergency (Crews Find Missing