Both companies displayed normative and garbage can model decision-making. For example, they wanted to keep the pressure low without knowing exactly how excessive the pressure levels were in the first place (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). Clearly, this is the reason they ignored the steps of the garbage can model, looking only at the solution to the problem rather than reinventing a solution. This was the first specific bias, overconfidence and the tendency to be too confident in their projected estimates. Furthermore, in the case of Deepwater Horizon, they did not have a reliable solution to the problem. For instance, both companies were reactive instead of proactive in identifying any issues, and both companies refused to work together to address the problems. Another example, they never shut the well down when they got the warning signs, this is clear evidence of framing and overconfidence on their
Both companies displayed normative and garbage can model decision-making. For example, they wanted to keep the pressure low without knowing exactly how excessive the pressure levels were in the first place (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013). Clearly, this is the reason they ignored the steps of the garbage can model, looking only at the solution to the problem rather than reinventing a solution. This was the first specific bias, overconfidence and the tendency to be too confident in their projected estimates. Furthermore, in the case of Deepwater Horizon, they did not have a reliable solution to the problem. For instance, both companies were reactive instead of proactive in identifying any issues, and both companies refused to work together to address the problems. Another example, they never shut the well down when they got the warning signs, this is clear evidence of framing and overconfidence on their