Cigman's position is that death can only be a misfortune for human beings. In the case of non-human animals, death cannot be a misfortune at all, not even a minor one. Furthermore, this applies equally to all non-human animals. Death cannot be a misfortune for any of them, regardless of their higher cognitive capacities, as in the case of chimpanzees.
Cigman (XXXX) considers the badness of death of non-human animals when discussing whether they should be granted the right to life. According to Cigman, one can only hold a right for x when losing x will be a misfortune for them. A subject may lack x in their life, but if the absence of x cannot be considered a misfortune for them, they do not need a right to secure them x. And when is an absence of a good a misfortune? Cigman unites the concepts of misfortune and desire, to argue that losing x can only be a misfortune for someone if they desire x. Furthermore, and importantly for our discussion, in order to …show more content…
She relies on the concept of categorical desires1 (Williams, XXXX) to argue that the desires that give us reasons to live are those that are concerned with the meaning of life and are unconditional to dying. And arguably, those desires are only possible for those beings that understand what is at stake with death. Therefore, her argument goes, animals cannot desire life given that they cannot understand death. Cigman claims that, to foster a desire to continue living, a being needs to understand death in the same way as we humans do. Specifically, she claims that the harm of death necessitates a grasp of immortality, the understanding of the closure of possibilities in one's life, and the comprehension of a few other complex concepts, such as agency, the value of life, and tragedy. With this criteria for the badness of death, it comes as no surprise that she considers animals to be excluded from
Cigman (XXXX) considers the badness of death of non-human animals when discussing whether they should be granted the right to life. According to Cigman, one can only hold a right for x when losing x will be a misfortune for them. A subject may lack x in their life, but if the absence of x cannot be considered a misfortune for them, they do not need a right to secure them x. And when is an absence of a good a misfortune? Cigman unites the concepts of misfortune and desire, to argue that losing x can only be a misfortune for someone if they desire x. Furthermore, and importantly for our discussion, in order to …show more content…
She relies on the concept of categorical desires1 (Williams, XXXX) to argue that the desires that give us reasons to live are those that are concerned with the meaning of life and are unconditional to dying. And arguably, those desires are only possible for those beings that understand what is at stake with death. Therefore, her argument goes, animals cannot desire life given that they cannot understand death. Cigman claims that, to foster a desire to continue living, a being needs to understand death in the same way as we humans do. Specifically, she claims that the harm of death necessitates a grasp of immortality, the understanding of the closure of possibilities in one's life, and the comprehension of a few other complex concepts, such as agency, the value of life, and tragedy. With this criteria for the badness of death, it comes as no surprise that she considers animals to be excluded from