David Hume Second Order Volitions

Second-order volitions are inadequate for defining the concept of a person. In this paper, I argue that Hume would disagree with Frankfurt, in that a person is to be identified with her second-order volitions, because human action is inconstant and manipulated by temporary feelings.
American Philosopher, Harry G. Frankfurt, claimed that second-order volitions defined the concept of a person. He said that it is the want to have the ‘desire’. I will now explain what he meant of this. Second-order volitions are wishes for a particular ‘desire’ to cause their will. Volitions are desires or choices, and second-order generally describes the series of being second (Webster). For example, if you want to watch your favorite movie alone instead of with your siblings, and the want brings you to watch the movie alone, then your second-order volitions succeeded. Frankfurt insisted that this is what defined the concept of a person. I will explain this in another example. If we want X, which is our first-order desire, then it is necessary for the want for X to cause our will, which is our second-order volition. For instance, I want to drink a can of soda, but then I want to have some water instead. My second-order …show more content…
Hume better understood that free will is necessary for people to act upon their desires. I agree with him because Frankfurt’s concept of person by second-order volitions is unreliable. He contradicted himself when he illustrated the unwilling addict argument. Namely, an act is only someone’s doing if it is cause by his or her desire (Lacewing). Therefore, relying on second-order volitions to define the concept of person is unwise because people could be manipulated or compelled. For that reason, the person cannot be held accountable. Lacewing gave the example, “I may want a cigarette, but I don’t want to want a cigarette – and this is why addictions leave us unfree”. I believe this statement agreed with Hume