v. Davis, the owner of a locker gave police officers permission to search the contents of a locker which included the defendant’s belongings and an unlocked metal box that held cocaine. The appellate court held that the consent to search was authorized and constitutional, and affirmed that there was a two prong test use to analyze whether the consent of the third party was valid. The party must have access to the area to be searched and also either common authority, a substantial interest in the area, or permission to gain access to the area. U.S. v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992). Using this test, we can determine that Mrs. Fallsbauer had access to the area to be searched because the shoe box used to be hers. The petitioner will contend that the shoe box was not the property of Mrs. Fallsbauer anymore because she but the shoebox on the dresser that she knew her son was using. However, because she had access to the box and had no explicit knowledge that her son was using the shoe box, she still had control of the shoe box. Due to her ownership of the shoe box, like the ownership of the locker in Davis, Mrs. Fallsbauer had both common authority and permission to gain access to the area. Therefore, the two requirements set forth in the precedent case cited in Davis can be applied here, showing that Mrs. Fallsbauer gave valid third party consent to search the shoe box. The police officers reasonably believed that Mrs. Fallsbauer was able to give valid
v. Davis, the owner of a locker gave police officers permission to search the contents of a locker which included the defendant’s belongings and an unlocked metal box that held cocaine. The appellate court held that the consent to search was authorized and constitutional, and affirmed that there was a two prong test use to analyze whether the consent of the third party was valid. The party must have access to the area to be searched and also either common authority, a substantial interest in the area, or permission to gain access to the area. U.S. v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1992). Using this test, we can determine that Mrs. Fallsbauer had access to the area to be searched because the shoe box used to be hers. The petitioner will contend that the shoe box was not the property of Mrs. Fallsbauer anymore because she but the shoebox on the dresser that she knew her son was using. However, because she had access to the box and had no explicit knowledge that her son was using the shoe box, she still had control of the shoe box. Due to her ownership of the shoe box, like the ownership of the locker in Davis, Mrs. Fallsbauer had both common authority and permission to gain access to the area. Therefore, the two requirements set forth in the precedent case cited in Davis can be applied here, showing that Mrs. Fallsbauer gave valid third party consent to search the shoe box. The police officers reasonably believed that Mrs. Fallsbauer was able to give valid