In an effort to argue for the existence of God, Saint Thomas Aquinas provides five cosmological arguments in his piece “The Existence of God”. The second argument he states examines causes and effects and looks to explain these series in regard to their beginning, or first cause (43:1-2). Aquinas says that the chain of causes and effects cannot go back to “infinity” (43:60) because when the first cause is taken out, so is its effect and every following effect (43:61). I find this claim plausible because this would mean that there would be no “caused” things in existence. Aquinas follows to say that “there obviously are such causes” (43:62) in existence, so the first cause must not have been taken away. In this paper, I will argue that Aquinas’
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For instance, he could say that God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” and that is why he is exempt from that condition (42: 3-4). Yet using this point as a response relies on the existence of God, so we must instead examine qualities of something that could be the “first efficient cause” in general. I believe that the “first efficient cause” in the series of all causes would have to be so supreme that it is able to begin such a grand chain of reactions. Some attributes of a first cause would be its power and ability to evoke change in something else. If it was taken out of the series, then the chain of events could not go on. For example the motion of the last car of a train. If there was no first car with an engine, the last train car would not move at all. The first efficient cause, or the first car, has to exist with the train as long as it is in motion. The quality of having an engine makes the first car that much better than all other train cars. Hence, I argue that the “first efficient cause” that Aquinas is arguing for is so superior that it can have the ability to cause itself, and consequently develop the chain of following effects.
The ability for Aquinas’ argument to overcome the objection of having a contradictory premise is still uncertain, although I have presented a possible response above. It is still unclear as to why the “first efficient cause”, or God, that Aquinas is arguing for would be able to create itself when he argues that nothing can create itself. It seems plausible to me that in order to be a first efficient cause, the phenomenon would have the utmost superior qualities. Therefore it would be able to create itself and not be subject to the same conditions as everything else in
For instance, he could say that God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” and that is why he is exempt from that condition (42: 3-4). Yet using this point as a response relies on the existence of God, so we must instead examine qualities of something that could be the “first efficient cause” in general. I believe that the “first efficient cause” in the series of all causes would have to be so supreme that it is able to begin such a grand chain of reactions. Some attributes of a first cause would be its power and ability to evoke change in something else. If it was taken out of the series, then the chain of events could not go on. For example the motion of the last car of a train. If there was no first car with an engine, the last train car would not move at all. The first efficient cause, or the first car, has to exist with the train as long as it is in motion. The quality of having an engine makes the first car that much better than all other train cars. Hence, I argue that the “first efficient cause” that Aquinas is arguing for is so superior that it can have the ability to cause itself, and consequently develop the chain of following effects.
The ability for Aquinas’ argument to overcome the objection of having a contradictory premise is still uncertain, although I have presented a possible response above. It is still unclear as to why the “first efficient cause”, or God, that Aquinas is arguing for would be able to create itself when he argues that nothing can create itself. It seems plausible to me that in order to be a first efficient cause, the phenomenon would have the utmost superior qualities. Therefore it would be able to create itself and not be subject to the same conditions as everything else in