There is no question that, throughout the history of China, there exists a trend of corruption which never quite seems to vanish, no matter what the Chairman at the time has tried in terms of combatting it. The issue came into primary focus in 1989 with anti-government demonstrations that forced the leadership to wage war against corruption, for fear of losing legitimacy as a party. And yet, corruption has not significantly decreased. With Xi Jinping’s announcement in 2012 that he would be undertaking a comprehensive anti-corruption campaign, the question “just how comprehensive” now has to be answered. With the establishment of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the government has set upon its task with vigor, and the
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The hearing took place in private in Tianjin, even though the trial was initially meant to be open and, with his aforementioned ties to the oil industry, Zhou had, over the years, amassed immense wealth, drawing revenue primarily through bribes and illegal business dealings that caused the state to lose massive amounts of money. His guilt certain, Zhou plead guilty on national television from inside on of the courtrooms he had once been in control of, “...his formerly jet-black hair turned white in confinement” (Forsythe). Thus, in spectacular fashion, Xi managed to remove members of the Party who opposed him, while concurrently eliminating corruption from the system—how serendipitous. Not to mention the fact that “...because of Mr. Zhou’s rank, top current and former leaders would have agreed on a verdict before the trial began...charges...were… ‘too important to be decided by the police, procurators or judges…’” (Tsang qtd in Forsythe), which only furthers the idea of Xi conspiring with other Party leaders to take down …show more content…
Wedeman suggests that Xi use Zhou as a way of “scaling back the campaign or at least easing off his attack on high-level corruption” because there is a fine line between showing the Party’s dedication to fighting corruption and delegitimizing the Party in the eyes of the public by implying the entire system is filled with tigers.
The effectiveness of Xi’s campaign remains, largely, to be seen. The goals of an anti-corruption campaign are, according to Wedeman: “...to cull out corrupt officials...to deter those who are now tempted...to convince the public that a regime is serious about fighting corruption, particularly in the highest places”. Xi’s progress is uncertain, and whether subsequent General Secretaries embrace the campaign will ultimately decide whether it was factional after
The hearing took place in private in Tianjin, even though the trial was initially meant to be open and, with his aforementioned ties to the oil industry, Zhou had, over the years, amassed immense wealth, drawing revenue primarily through bribes and illegal business dealings that caused the state to lose massive amounts of money. His guilt certain, Zhou plead guilty on national television from inside on of the courtrooms he had once been in control of, “...his formerly jet-black hair turned white in confinement” (Forsythe). Thus, in spectacular fashion, Xi managed to remove members of the Party who opposed him, while concurrently eliminating corruption from the system—how serendipitous. Not to mention the fact that “...because of Mr. Zhou’s rank, top current and former leaders would have agreed on a verdict before the trial began...charges...were… ‘too important to be decided by the police, procurators or judges…’” (Tsang qtd in Forsythe), which only furthers the idea of Xi conspiring with other Party leaders to take down …show more content…
Wedeman suggests that Xi use Zhou as a way of “scaling back the campaign or at least easing off his attack on high-level corruption” because there is a fine line between showing the Party’s dedication to fighting corruption and delegitimizing the Party in the eyes of the public by implying the entire system is filled with tigers.
The effectiveness of Xi’s campaign remains, largely, to be seen. The goals of an anti-corruption campaign are, according to Wedeman: “...to cull out corrupt officials...to deter those who are now tempted...to convince the public that a regime is serious about fighting corruption, particularly in the highest places”. Xi’s progress is uncertain, and whether subsequent General Secretaries embrace the campaign will ultimately decide whether it was factional after