Time is of the of the essence in the contract between Construction Supply and Stadium Builders, in which Construction Supply failed to meet the deadline for a seat installation. Time is generally not of the essence, unless it is established to be of the essence in the contract, or it can be inferred from the behavior of the parties, the object of the contract, or from the circumstances surrounding the agreement.
In Drazen v. American Oil Co., 395 A.2d 32 (1978) the dispute arose from a contract for the purchase of a property. There was an initial payment of $10,000 and the remaining amount on or before June 1, 1976. Drazin asked for an extension to October 1 in order to obtain a license to sell alcohol. It was granted. By October 1, the agreement has not been reached, but …show more content…
The Trial Court denied specific performance and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that, although time was not initially of the essence, it became of the essence when American Oil Co. gave a reasonable extension to reach the agreement and stated that if the agreement was not reached by that date, the contract would be null and void. In Kasten Contr. Co. v. Maple Ridge Constr. Co., 245 Md. 373 (1967) the dispute involved the sale and purchase of a tract of land. Kasten (the seller) demanded contract performance, although the time had expired, because it was not agreed that time would be of the essence. The initial time was sixty days. Some financial difficulties arose so Kasten granted an extension to March 19, 1965, but again time was not stipulated to be of the essence. Mapled requested another extension, but Kasten denied it. Mapled notified Kasten three days after the expiration of the extension that it had applied for title examination. Kasten replied that since the extension had expired; the contract was null and void. The Chancellor determined that time was not of the essence because of the behavior of the seller, which The Chancellor qualified as
In Drazen v. American Oil Co., 395 A.2d 32 (1978) the dispute arose from a contract for the purchase of a property. There was an initial payment of $10,000 and the remaining amount on or before June 1, 1976. Drazin asked for an extension to October 1 in order to obtain a license to sell alcohol. It was granted. By October 1, the agreement has not been reached, but …show more content…
The Trial Court denied specific performance and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that, although time was not initially of the essence, it became of the essence when American Oil Co. gave a reasonable extension to reach the agreement and stated that if the agreement was not reached by that date, the contract would be null and void. In Kasten Contr. Co. v. Maple Ridge Constr. Co., 245 Md. 373 (1967) the dispute involved the sale and purchase of a tract of land. Kasten (the seller) demanded contract performance, although the time had expired, because it was not agreed that time would be of the essence. The initial time was sixty days. Some financial difficulties arose so Kasten granted an extension to March 19, 1965, but again time was not stipulated to be of the essence. Mapled requested another extension, but Kasten denied it. Mapled notified Kasten three days after the expiration of the extension that it had applied for title examination. Kasten replied that since the extension had expired; the contract was null and void. The Chancellor determined that time was not of the essence because of the behavior of the seller, which The Chancellor qualified as