Now that I have presented de Waal's argument, I turn to exploring and evaluating Korsgaard and Kitcher's responses. Before continuing, please note that although these positions are formulated independent, I present them together. I do so, because they both argue for a very similar idea surrounding how human morality must be based in “cognitive self-consciousness about the properties of ones proposed line of action” (Macedo, xvii, 2006). Kitcher does so by appealing to “Humean/Smithian 'spectatorism'” where as Korsgaard appeals to Kantian conceptualizations surrounding “genuine” morality (Macedo, xvii, 2006). Moreover, I ask that you also bear in mind the two following questions, which I regard as central to de Waal's position:
1. Can the …show more content…
According to Kitcher and Korsgaard, this problem occurs because although de Waal has succeeded in collecting and presenting an impressive amount of evidence for the presence of pro-social behaviors in non-human primates, he “hasn’t thought as hard about the human phenomenon he takes to be anticipated or foreshadowed in chimpanzee social life” (Kitcher, p.123, 2006). In other words, what Kitcher and Korsgaard convincingly convey is that if we analyze the criteria for human moral agency further, it seems wrong to accept that it includes nothing more the emphatic or altruistic dispositions purported for by de Waal. They continue, that what de Waal has demonstrated here is, at most, that non-human primates are emphatic creatures who act on whatever desire or impulse they feel most strongly at a given moment in time. Furthermore, they do so without concern for the effectiveness of said action with regard to the situation at hand. From this, they concede that de Waal is correct in contending that the actions of primates are occasionally motivated by their emphatic dispositions and in turn, these commentators agree with the author's sentiments that the altruistic tendencies primates demonstrate can be reasonably regarded as those of “moderately
1. Can the …show more content…
According to Kitcher and Korsgaard, this problem occurs because although de Waal has succeeded in collecting and presenting an impressive amount of evidence for the presence of pro-social behaviors in non-human primates, he “hasn’t thought as hard about the human phenomenon he takes to be anticipated or foreshadowed in chimpanzee social life” (Kitcher, p.123, 2006). In other words, what Kitcher and Korsgaard convincingly convey is that if we analyze the criteria for human moral agency further, it seems wrong to accept that it includes nothing more the emphatic or altruistic dispositions purported for by de Waal. They continue, that what de Waal has demonstrated here is, at most, that non-human primates are emphatic creatures who act on whatever desire or impulse they feel most strongly at a given moment in time. Furthermore, they do so without concern for the effectiveness of said action with regard to the situation at hand. From this, they concede that de Waal is correct in contending that the actions of primates are occasionally motivated by their emphatic dispositions and in turn, these commentators agree with the author's sentiments that the altruistic tendencies primates demonstrate can be reasonably regarded as those of “moderately