Objective Report
Introduction
The Collins Class submarine project started in 1981-82 and finished with the sixth submarine in 2003. It was Australia’s biggest and most expensive military project to date, costing in excess of six billion. Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) was met with support from the Labor Party and several trade unions, they were to build the Submarines in South Australia using a Swedish design and were intended to replace the Oberon class submarines upon their completion. They were designed to meet four requirements:
• They would be intended for the Australasian region operational environment
• Fitted with an advanced combat system for an extended service
• Capable of delivering roles including, hunter-killer and emergency/peace …show more content…
There was controversy over the selection process by which the clear favourite, being the German design was discarded in favour of the Swiss and as a result of poor time management, the Australian Government took five years to acquire a project tender. Another contributing factor to the Collins Class schedule blowout was mismanagement of time due to a relationship breakdown between the submarine company management director, Hans Ohff and Chief of Navy, Admiral Don Chalmers. Six submarines were ordered, but only three were delivered and two years over schedule. Australia's defence capability was reduced as a result and was ambiguous whether or not the Navy had accepted the submarines as fully operational, no responsibility was taken. Hans Ohff believed he honoured the contract and delivered the subs, but Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Don Chalmers view was that Hans Ohff delivered them with known problems and should take ownership. As a result of vague requirements in relation to the project schedule it was unknown whether Australia would acquire fully operational Collins submarines, leading the Federal Government to set up an inquiry into the project and delays, putting pressure on the Department of Defence (ABC TV (Four Corners), 1999)(Yule & Woolner, 2008)(Project Management Institut, …show more content…
Commodore Mick Dunne, Royal Australian Navy, 1963-1998, believed that during the 1980’s, Royal and American Navy’s said the combat system wasn’t going to work, yet the Australian’s went with the design anyway, gambling with time, budget and quality whilst neglecting a clear and concise set of requirements. In 1992, the submarines combat system should have been fitted, but it was still being worked on years later. The next issue was the acoustic signature, Commodore Mick Dunne, Royal Australian Navy, 1963-1998, believed that due to this problem, it would be difficult to deploy the submarine in operational zones until the problem was rectified, delaying the project further. It was unclear how long it would take to correct the problem if they could at all. The 30-year-old Oberon Class was reinstated as a result of the delay, they were silent and had a good operational record. It was the only capable submarine the Navy had at the time. These defects created a safety concern in regard to the Collins class submarines which were required to be operated far from Australia. This was a result of poor management based on unclear requirements further extending the project schedule and weakening Australia’s reputation and defence (ABC TV (Four Corners), 1999)(Yule & Woolner,
Introduction
The Collins Class submarine project started in 1981-82 and finished with the sixth submarine in 2003. It was Australia’s biggest and most expensive military project to date, costing in excess of six billion. Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC) was met with support from the Labor Party and several trade unions, they were to build the Submarines in South Australia using a Swedish design and were intended to replace the Oberon class submarines upon their completion. They were designed to meet four requirements:
• They would be intended for the Australasian region operational environment
• Fitted with an advanced combat system for an extended service
• Capable of delivering roles including, hunter-killer and emergency/peace …show more content…
There was controversy over the selection process by which the clear favourite, being the German design was discarded in favour of the Swiss and as a result of poor time management, the Australian Government took five years to acquire a project tender. Another contributing factor to the Collins Class schedule blowout was mismanagement of time due to a relationship breakdown between the submarine company management director, Hans Ohff and Chief of Navy, Admiral Don Chalmers. Six submarines were ordered, but only three were delivered and two years over schedule. Australia's defence capability was reduced as a result and was ambiguous whether or not the Navy had accepted the submarines as fully operational, no responsibility was taken. Hans Ohff believed he honoured the contract and delivered the subs, but Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Don Chalmers view was that Hans Ohff delivered them with known problems and should take ownership. As a result of vague requirements in relation to the project schedule it was unknown whether Australia would acquire fully operational Collins submarines, leading the Federal Government to set up an inquiry into the project and delays, putting pressure on the Department of Defence (ABC TV (Four Corners), 1999)(Yule & Woolner, 2008)(Project Management Institut, …show more content…
Commodore Mick Dunne, Royal Australian Navy, 1963-1998, believed that during the 1980’s, Royal and American Navy’s said the combat system wasn’t going to work, yet the Australian’s went with the design anyway, gambling with time, budget and quality whilst neglecting a clear and concise set of requirements. In 1992, the submarines combat system should have been fitted, but it was still being worked on years later. The next issue was the acoustic signature, Commodore Mick Dunne, Royal Australian Navy, 1963-1998, believed that due to this problem, it would be difficult to deploy the submarine in operational zones until the problem was rectified, delaying the project further. It was unclear how long it would take to correct the problem if they could at all. The 30-year-old Oberon Class was reinstated as a result of the delay, they were silent and had a good operational record. It was the only capable submarine the Navy had at the time. These defects created a safety concern in regard to the Collins class submarines which were required to be operated far from Australia. This was a result of poor management based on unclear requirements further extending the project schedule and weakening Australia’s reputation and defence (ABC TV (Four Corners), 1999)(Yule & Woolner,