Oklahoma (1988), and set a new precedence in the sentencing of juveniles across America based on a national consensus of decency and scientific studies (Justice Kennedy in Simmons v. Roper opinion, 2005). On the other, and as voiced by the dissenting justices, it cites and holds what some see as political, social, and foreign influences, rather than the interpretation or meaning of the law and spirit of the Constitution as implied by Justice Scalia in his dissent. Citing Scalia in his opening paragraph, “The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent” (Simmons v. Roper, 2005). In defense of Scalia’s dissent, as cited in the syllabus of the case (2)(c), “The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18. See, e.g., Thompson, supra, at 830–831, and n.
Oklahoma (1988), and set a new precedence in the sentencing of juveniles across America based on a national consensus of decency and scientific studies (Justice Kennedy in Simmons v. Roper opinion, 2005). On the other, and as voiced by the dissenting justices, it cites and holds what some see as political, social, and foreign influences, rather than the interpretation or meaning of the law and spirit of the Constitution as implied by Justice Scalia in his dissent. Citing Scalia in his opening paragraph, “The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent” (Simmons v. Roper, 2005). In defense of Scalia’s dissent, as cited in the syllabus of the case (2)(c), “The overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty is not controlling here, but provides respected and significant confirmation for the Court’s determination that the penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18. See, e.g., Thompson, supra, at 830–831, and n.