I would suggest reorganizing the NASA’s management function to Johnson Space center managers who was over the Challenger Space Shuttle Program wasn’t a wise decision, considering how space shuttle Challenger ended in a heartbreaking tragedy. Based on the reading on the shuttle Challenger disaster, I am not sure how they didn’t learn from history, and what they expected when they allowed the same shuttle program to be controlled by the exact management team who had authority over funding and shuttle activities. Moreover, upper management and Linda Ham were two groups that worked closely together and was aware that there were evidence and risk concerning the foam. Meanwhile, NASA Columbia crew deceived in believing that all safety measures were taken, and I am sure they didn’t have a clue that the foam malfunction wasn’t corrected, considering this had been a known issue for
I would suggest reorganizing the NASA’s management function to Johnson Space center managers who was over the Challenger Space Shuttle Program wasn’t a wise decision, considering how space shuttle Challenger ended in a heartbreaking tragedy. Based on the reading on the shuttle Challenger disaster, I am not sure how they didn’t learn from history, and what they expected when they allowed the same shuttle program to be controlled by the exact management team who had authority over funding and shuttle activities. Moreover, upper management and Linda Ham were two groups that worked closely together and was aware that there were evidence and risk concerning the foam. Meanwhile, NASA Columbia crew deceived in believing that all safety measures were taken, and I am sure they didn’t have a clue that the foam malfunction wasn’t corrected, considering this had been a known issue for