The engineers at Morton Thiokol, Inc. had discovered the possibility of the O-rings failing at temperature conditions below 53 °F during lift off, which they relayed to the management of MTI. On the eve of lift off, January 27, 1986, NASA and MTI held a telecon …show more content…
It is important to note that NASA had earlier in the development stage of the Challenger, set up a safety unit tasked with the safety and welfare of the astronauts. This unit was called The Space Shuttle Crew Safety Panel (SSCSP). It was comprised of engineers and staff from the Astronaut Office at NASA (Diane Vaughan, 1990, p. 239). NASA however seemed to have lost interest in the astronauts’ safety as Diane Vaughan stated that after the Challenger’s development stage, there was deliberation on the importance of the existence of the SSCSP (Diane Vaughan, 1990, p. 241). By 1981, the unit was no longer in existence. NASA had chosen to adhere to its strict schedule and value for timeliness above the safety of the astronauts. Human life should always be the primary concern in the development and production of any technology. Technology such as the Challenger exists for the sake of bettering human welfare and interaction so the cause for such technology would only be defeated if we fail to account for the safety of the people who are to benefit from its successes. During the 27th January telecon, neither MTI nor NASA once inquired about how a failed O-ring would affect the astronauts aboard the Challenger. NASA seemed to be engulfed with embarking on the mission for the sake of the objectives it set out to achieve that it forgot about the men and women who would be in the shuttle if something were to go wrong. NASA was also faced with achieving its research goals while still maintaining mission integrity. Had they not carried out the Challenger mission, deployment of satellites and collection of data relevant to scientific and military development may not have been achieved. NASA was however fully aware of a trend in O-ring erosions based on data collected from previous flights (Diane Vaughan, 1990, p. 235). MTI had even