A primary cause is the growing congressional polarization that has occurred from 1956-2008. This …show more content…
Newly elected member of Congress replace more moderate members of Congress, yet, members who serve over decades slowly move more toward an ideological pole and away from the median (Theriault 2008), and schedule procedural votes to discredit position the opposition party (Jessee and Theriault 2010). This could be due, in part, to institutional rules change to promote majoritarian party control and party discipline in Congress (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). Since party control of Congress and political institutions becomes more important to pass a partisan-polarized party platform, as a result elections become more contentious and competitive. Political party leaders strategize elections to target moderate candidates of the opposite party as a way to gain majorities in Congress (Lee …show more content…
Rules restricting political parties’ control over campaign spending and candidate selection promote greater polarization. Fundraising changes electoral incentives for parties to be ideological heterogeneous (Canes-Wrone 2015). La Raja and Schaffner (2015) evaluates the increasing polarization of parties, they determine that states with strict rules on how parties raise and spend campaign funds determine the level of party pragmatism and level of party purism as an organization. Purist seeks ideological purity, as parties lose the ability to influence elections and candidate selection, party donors, Super PACS, and party activities move the party in an extreme ideological direction by supporting extreme, polarizing candidates. In states where parties have greater freedom to collect and disperse campaign funds, the party is more moderate and supports centrist candidates who are closer to the median-voter. Their research, however, does not take into account that party institutional leaders, such as Senate and House leadership, who seek to gain the majority in Congress, and this majority-seeking behavior decreases the willingness to support moderates who are uncertain to support the party in legislative activities (Lee 2015). Additionally, parties “micro-target” and mobilize segments who support their agenda