Dr. Jeffress claims that Hobby Lobby does not obstruct women’s right to obtain abortions or health care, and that the government compels Hobby Lobby to become complicit in a religiously objectionable act. This relates to the the Court’s argument that the contraceptive mandate does not fulfill RFRA’s requirement for the least restrictive means test. However, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004), the Court, speaking on speech restriction under the First Amendment, describes the least restrictive means test as based on “available, effective alternatives.” Justice Ginsburg writes, “the Government has shown there is no less restrictive, equally effective means.” The need for easily accessible contraceptives would not be met with a program funded and administered separately from existing employee-based benefits. Therefore, the Court-offered alternative of having the government fund contraceptives would not fulfill the compelling interests that Congress sought to accomplish through the mandate and does not qualify as an available and less restrictive alternative. Exemption on these grounds also contradicts a precedent the Court has established through cases including Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985), in which the Court struck down a law accommodating employees’ observance of the Sabbath due to the burden imposed on the employer, stating that accommodations to religious beliefs must not significantly impinge upon the interests of third
Dr. Jeffress claims that Hobby Lobby does not obstruct women’s right to obtain abortions or health care, and that the government compels Hobby Lobby to become complicit in a religiously objectionable act. This relates to the the Court’s argument that the contraceptive mandate does not fulfill RFRA’s requirement for the least restrictive means test. However, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004), the Court, speaking on speech restriction under the First Amendment, describes the least restrictive means test as based on “available, effective alternatives.” Justice Ginsburg writes, “the Government has shown there is no less restrictive, equally effective means.” The need for easily accessible contraceptives would not be met with a program funded and administered separately from existing employee-based benefits. Therefore, the Court-offered alternative of having the government fund contraceptives would not fulfill the compelling interests that Congress sought to accomplish through the mandate and does not qualify as an available and less restrictive alternative. Exemption on these grounds also contradicts a precedent the Court has established through cases including Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985), in which the Court struck down a law accommodating employees’ observance of the Sabbath due to the burden imposed on the employer, stating that accommodations to religious beliefs must not significantly impinge upon the interests of third