Frances House Case

Not yet finished, Plaintiffs then claim Frances House did not “tell the reader” what its “purpose” was in challenging certain allegations in paragraph in counts L and LIV. Plaintiff again quotes long passages from its Seventh Amended Complaint and then concludes that paragraph 25 of Counts LII and LVI is “merely a statement of medical fact.” (Pls. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at 29.) Instead of recognizing the obvious, i.e., that alleging “certain actions are indicative” of emotional distress represents an opinion, Plaintiffs reiterate their argument that somehow complying with section 2-603 of the Code and Illinois’ fact-pleading requirements would somehow undermine the ID/DD Community Care Act. Plaintiffs also quarrel with Frances House’s argument that Counts LI and LV are deficient because they fail to allege the timeframe in which Frances House allegedly obtained signed consent forms from Leitzen. These allegations involve a written instrument, yet, Plaintiffs did not attach any signed consent forms to their Seventh Amended Complaint or allege the timeframe in which the signed consent was allegedly obtained. Plaintiffs appear to fail to appreciate, or perhaps wish to ignore, that the timeframe relating to consent is critical in this case in that the duties that the law imposes upon Frances House can be determined by when consent was given in relation to when Leitzen was declared incompetent. The absence of this detail makes it impossible for Frances House to meaningfully respond. Indeed, section 2-606 of the Code contemplates that claims founded on a written instrument “must be attached to the pleading as an exhibit” (735 ILCS 5/2-606 (West 2010)), and Frances House cannot respond so as to narrow the issues and proofs for trial without at least knowing the timeframe when such consent was allegedly obtained. Once again, Plaintiffs did not address this simple argument. Rather, in a fit of hyperbole, they appear to claim that Frances House’s argument that a pleading party should comply with Illinois’ fact-pleading requirement somehow requires the Court to adopt a “monstrous” position that an allegedly mentally handicapped challenged person can understand medical treatment. Stripped to its essence, Plaintiffs’ 32-page argument fails to address the well-settled maxims that (1) Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, (2) the drafter of a complaint bears the burden to balance pleading too little and too much factual information, and (3) pleadings that violate section 2-603 of the Code may be stricken and dismissed. Indeed, the only explanation Plaintiffs offer to justify their disregard for Section 2-603 is that Frances House successfully moved to dismiss their Fifth Amended Complaint for not containing sufficient factual details. (Pls. Resp. Mot. Dismiss at 4-5.) Yet, Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that, if a prior complaint is dismissed for lack of specificity, a plaintiff is then given free rein to (a) disregard section 2-603’s requirement that a pleading contain short and concise statements, and (b) ignore binding authority from the Second District Appellate Court that a plaintiff bears the burden of walking the line between pleading too little and too much factual detail. ( See Mot. Dismiss at 3-4.) In sum, Frances House’s motion to strike and dismiss pursuant to section 2-603 underscores the importance of proper pleadings. Because Plaintiffs’ Seventh Amended Complaint contains redundant and jumbled allegations, which often consist of mere conclusory statements, this Court should strike it pursuant to section 2-603. II. Counts LIII, LIV, LV, LVI, and LVII are Based on Same Operative Facts and are Duplicative. In attempting to rebut Frances House’s argument that various counts are impermissibly redundant, Plaintiffs note that Illinois allows pleading in the alternative distinguishes between negligent and intentional acts. (Pls. Resp. Mot. Dismiss, p. 34.) Plaintiffs proceed to explain that Illinois recognizes claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that these causes of action require …show more content…
Indeed, in Neade v. Protes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 443 (2000), the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Plaintiffs’ exact argument. There, the plaintiff sued a doctor for both medical negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty. Id. at 438. The supreme court declined to hold up the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim, finding that the claim was merely a “re-presentment” of her medical negligence claim. Id. at