For it appears to be focused on the farfetched claim that all animals who trust that grass is green have one physical property in like manner—the property which is indistinguishable to the conviction that grass is green. Therefore (and others) a few physicalists receive a weaker variant of physicalism, which does not have this outcome. This adaptation of physicalism holds that every single specific question and occasions are physical yet permits that there are mental properties, which are not indistinguishable to physical properties. (Davidson (1970) is one motivation for such perspectives.) This sort of see, 'non-reductive physicalism ', is a sort of dualism, since it holds there are two sorts of property, mental and physical. Be that as it may, it is not *substance* dualism, since it holds that all substances are physical
For it appears to be focused on the farfetched claim that all animals who trust that grass is green have one physical property in like manner—the property which is indistinguishable to the conviction that grass is green. Therefore (and others) a few physicalists receive a weaker variant of physicalism, which does not have this outcome. This adaptation of physicalism holds that every single specific question and occasions are physical yet permits that there are mental properties, which are not indistinguishable to physical properties. (Davidson (1970) is one motivation for such perspectives.) This sort of see, 'non-reductive physicalism ', is a sort of dualism, since it holds there are two sorts of property, mental and physical. Be that as it may, it is not *substance* dualism, since it holds that all substances are physical