Descartes introduced metaphysical considerations: the immutability of the lawgiver God, whose action is always constant because otherwise would be imperfect, and imperfection is unthinkable in relation to divinity (Henry, 2004, p. 100). In other words, laws of nature are causal because they derive from God’s immutable character. This God, however, differed from the voluntarist God of Ockham’s tradition. In fact, when Descartes founded his laws of nature upon God’s immutability, guaranteed that they would not be changed in the future and, in consequence, could be known a priori (Henry, 2004, p. 90). By so doing, Henry recognises the importance of debates on providentialism not only in the Cartesian introduction of laws of nature but also in subsequent authors such as Boyle, Leibniz or Newton.
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Rather, he tries to connect specific uses of the word in a variety of authors, in the general framework of his two, interacting meanings of laws that shall finally meet in Newton. However, Steinle’s argument includes without further clarification problematic authors such as Galileo, who barely uses the word. This, for sure, is not enough argument to let Galileo aside, but his introduction would require further developments in order to do plausible the historical account. In fact, claiming that “one thing [is] to have the concept of a certain type of statements, and another to call it ‘laws of nature’” (Steinle, 2008, p. 216) is methodologically problematic. Moreover, if we add to this Steinle’s two general characterisations of laws –empirical regularities and principles of explanation–, this would validate the introduction of virtually any seventeenth century author concerned with natural philosophy. In consequence, the problem of laws of nature
Rather, he tries to connect specific uses of the word in a variety of authors, in the general framework of his two, interacting meanings of laws that shall finally meet in Newton. However, Steinle’s argument includes without further clarification problematic authors such as Galileo, who barely uses the word. This, for sure, is not enough argument to let Galileo aside, but his introduction would require further developments in order to do plausible the historical account. In fact, claiming that “one thing [is] to have the concept of a certain type of statements, and another to call it ‘laws of nature’” (Steinle, 2008, p. 216) is methodologically problematic. Moreover, if we add to this Steinle’s two general characterisations of laws –empirical regularities and principles of explanation–, this would validate the introduction of virtually any seventeenth century author concerned with natural philosophy. In consequence, the problem of laws of nature