Plaintiff Yvonne Palacio appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion for class certification against defendant Jan & Gail’s Care Homes, Inc. (Care Homes). Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding she failed to establish a well-defined community of interests among class members. At hire, employees of Care Homes are required to sign an agreement waiving their right to uninterrupted meal periods in accordance with the facility’s standard operating procedures. Plaintiff argues Care Homes was obligated under the Labor Code to inform employees they have the right to revoke the agreement at any time. As a result, plaintiff asserts class certification is proper because Care Homes instituted a general policy or practice that
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They were also charged with three misdemeanor counts of violating LAMC section 12.21, subdivision A.1(a), based on their unpermitted use of land in operating the MMB on the same dates. Defendants pled not guilty, and the case was set for jury trial. Prior to the start of trial, Luzuriaga filed a memorandum of points and authorities, arguing defendants‟ burden of proof to establish the affirmative defense in LAMC section 45.19.6.3 was only to raise a reasonable doubt as to its existence. Following the swearing in of 12 jurors to try the case, but before selecting and swearing in the two alternate jurors, the court heard argument and ruled on the issue of the burden of proof. The court determined defendants had the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to warrant the jury being instructed on the defense, and the People then had the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Following the court's ruling, the People announced they would be unable to proceed with the trial. The court dismissed the case pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and the People filed a timely notice of …show more content…
. . cardiac patients." Among her complaints was "the lack of a legally required Standardized Procedure" authorizing the performance of nurseled stress testing. Nosal-Tabor alleged that she had "confirmed with her licensing agency that such testing was unsafe," and claimed that the licensing agency had "warned [her] to stop doing it in the manner Sharp demanded." Nosal-Tabor also alleged that she made a formal complaint to a Sharp compliance hotline in October 2011, and that she was "written up the following week." In addition, Nosal-Tabor alleged that in February 2012, she was given a poor performance review and was suspended without pay for several days in retaliation for her complaints. NosalTabor further alleged that in April 2012, Sharp terminated her employment after she refused to perform "an unsafe cardiac test." In a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Nosal-Tabor claimed that Sharp's termination of her employment violated the public policies 5 embodied in Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, former Labor Code section 1102.5,2 Business and Professions Code section 2725, and California Code of Regulations, title 16, sections 1379 and 1470 through 1474.3 Nosal-Tabor also brought a direct claim for a violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, in which
They were also charged with three misdemeanor counts of violating LAMC section 12.21, subdivision A.1(a), based on their unpermitted use of land in operating the MMB on the same dates. Defendants pled not guilty, and the case was set for jury trial. Prior to the start of trial, Luzuriaga filed a memorandum of points and authorities, arguing defendants‟ burden of proof to establish the affirmative defense in LAMC section 45.19.6.3 was only to raise a reasonable doubt as to its existence. Following the swearing in of 12 jurors to try the case, but before selecting and swearing in the two alternate jurors, the court heard argument and ruled on the issue of the burden of proof. The court determined defendants had the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to warrant the jury being instructed on the defense, and the People then had the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Following the court's ruling, the People announced they would be unable to proceed with the trial. The court dismissed the case pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and the People filed a timely notice of …show more content…
. . cardiac patients." Among her complaints was "the lack of a legally required Standardized Procedure" authorizing the performance of nurseled stress testing. Nosal-Tabor alleged that she had "confirmed with her licensing agency that such testing was unsafe," and claimed that the licensing agency had "warned [her] to stop doing it in the manner Sharp demanded." Nosal-Tabor also alleged that she made a formal complaint to a Sharp compliance hotline in October 2011, and that she was "written up the following week." In addition, Nosal-Tabor alleged that in February 2012, she was given a poor performance review and was suspended without pay for several days in retaliation for her complaints. NosalTabor further alleged that in April 2012, Sharp terminated her employment after she refused to perform "an unsafe cardiac test." In a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Nosal-Tabor claimed that Sharp's termination of her employment violated the public policies 5 embodied in Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, former Labor Code section 1102.5,2 Business and Professions Code section 2725, and California Code of Regulations, title 16, sections 1379 and 1470 through 1474.3 Nosal-Tabor also brought a direct claim for a violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, in which