With respect to the four divisions differentiating state pay equity statutes nationally, Kansas’s current pay equity statute applies to all employers, public and private, and falls into the “equal work” or “equal worth” category with twenty-one other states. Kansas’s law does not include language that would potentially broaden the scope of comparison employees bringing claims under the statute could use for support. For example, the state does not allow for comparison of “similar working conditions” — the statute only allows for equality of the employee work and environments being evaluated. Despite its lack of flexibility …show more content…
The state has only a few decisions under its pay equity statute and the federal Equal Pay Act, most dating between 1990 and 1995. However, turning first to Kansas courts’ application of existing pay equity laws in those cases and then to California, New York, and Massachusetts’ pay equity provisions to determine how a broadened statute would impact the outcomes provides an initial view into how Kansas case law might respond to new pay equity trends. A similar analysis of Kansas’s more robust federal case law history under the Equal Pay Act can also be instructive in predicting how a broadened federal pay equity statute would be interpreted in …show more content…
Department of Human Resources, provides another perspective on the state’s interpretation of statutes regulating wage discrimination in the administrative agency context. The plaintiff, a state employee, claimed a “position-to-position study” comparing job responsibilities and wages was required to determine whether his salary was inappropriately lowered because of a job reclassification by the Kansas Department of Human Resources and the Kansas Department of Administration, Division of Personnel Services. The court discussed the governing Kansas statutes and Kansas Administrative Regulations and concluded that though a “goal of treating similar positions similarly” existed, the statutes and Regulations did not explicitly mandate “equal pay for equal work.” The court held that the agency director in question had discretion over “the decision of whether to do a position-to-position study.” In a situation where “a new [job] classification system was being put into place,” the court concluded the agencies involved were not acting “unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously” when they decided to reclassify the plaintiff’s position and