The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, is an act of Canadian Parliament that is colloquially referred to as ‘Bill C-51’ or ‘the Bill’, and any mentions of such will, unless explicitly stated, refer to the Act as it was passed and not to the proposed Bill. Bill C-51’s aim is to increase intelligence sharing, and expand the powers of both CSIS and the politics with regard to potential acts of terrorism. The Bill’s passage was remarkably controversial, supported only by the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party and the Liberal Party (who only supported the Bill with an aim to amend it). Indeed, it was so contentious that the New Democratic Party initiated a filibuster in an attempt to defeat it. Bill C-51 has been criticised by numerous agencies and
…show more content…
However, even using only this layman’s definition, it is already clear that Bill C-51 violates the Rule of Law. In particular, the requirement that the laws restricting arbitrary power must be ‘well-defined’. The text of Section 12.1 of the bill enables CSIS to “[Take] measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce the threat ,” and only requires that there be “reasonable grounds to believe ” that there is a genuine threat to Canadian security, and that the measures taken to reduce this threat are “reasonable and proportional in the circumstances .” The text of the Bill does not define or elucidate on what these measures might be, what reasonable grounds may look like, or even what limits could be considered reasonable and proportional, excepting the provision that CSIS cannot violate the CCORAF without a first obtaining a warrant from the Director of CSIS “or any employee who is designated by the Minister for the purpose [of doing so] ” — and again, the Bill only requires that the Director or employee in question has the previously-cited ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that such a warrant is necessary . Without the …show more content…
The ‘well-defined’ requirement outlined by the OED’s definition of Rule of Law carries over into Fuller and Dicey’s conditions of the Rule of Law – one of Fuller’s requirements is that the ‘guiding norms’ that are made into law must be understandable . Of course, if the laws are not well defined, it becomes impossible for a citizen or subject to conduct themselves according to these binding norms, essentially rendering them pointless — especially since if a norm cannot be followed (due to the fact that it is not understandable), then it violates another of Fuller’s conditions, as it essentially makes the “requirements of the norms beyond the means of the affected party .” Furthermore, it violates several other conditions due to this lack of well-defined legislation: since these laws do not define the scope or extent of the power afforded to CSIS under this enabling act, Bill C-51 violates the condition that a binding nor cannot empower the authorities to rule arbitrarily , seeing as the Bill empowers its governors to do exactly that. When the powers given to an organisation are so broad as to be arbitrary, the powers do nothing to enable the security of those who are legally bound to follow it — instead, it strips them of their rights, liberties, and even the very security it is designed to protect, instead granting power to the
However, even using only this layman’s definition, it is already clear that Bill C-51 violates the Rule of Law. In particular, the requirement that the laws restricting arbitrary power must be ‘well-defined’. The text of Section 12.1 of the bill enables CSIS to “[Take] measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce the threat ,” and only requires that there be “reasonable grounds to believe ” that there is a genuine threat to Canadian security, and that the measures taken to reduce this threat are “reasonable and proportional in the circumstances .” The text of the Bill does not define or elucidate on what these measures might be, what reasonable grounds may look like, or even what limits could be considered reasonable and proportional, excepting the provision that CSIS cannot violate the CCORAF without a first obtaining a warrant from the Director of CSIS “or any employee who is designated by the Minister for the purpose [of doing so] ” — and again, the Bill only requires that the Director or employee in question has the previously-cited ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that such a warrant is necessary . Without the …show more content…
The ‘well-defined’ requirement outlined by the OED’s definition of Rule of Law carries over into Fuller and Dicey’s conditions of the Rule of Law – one of Fuller’s requirements is that the ‘guiding norms’ that are made into law must be understandable . Of course, if the laws are not well defined, it becomes impossible for a citizen or subject to conduct themselves according to these binding norms, essentially rendering them pointless — especially since if a norm cannot be followed (due to the fact that it is not understandable), then it violates another of Fuller’s conditions, as it essentially makes the “requirements of the norms beyond the means of the affected party .” Furthermore, it violates several other conditions due to this lack of well-defined legislation: since these laws do not define the scope or extent of the power afforded to CSIS under this enabling act, Bill C-51 violates the condition that a binding nor cannot empower the authorities to rule arbitrarily , seeing as the Bill empowers its governors to do exactly that. When the powers given to an organisation are so broad as to be arbitrary, the powers do nothing to enable the security of those who are legally bound to follow it — instead, it strips them of their rights, liberties, and even the very security it is designed to protect, instead granting power to the