The surgery of split-brain has led to different conclusions as to how many minds there are in one body. There is a total of five different hypotheses that are popular with the philosophers about the split-brain outcome, but I will only be mentioning three of them. One of the main hypotheses is that of Tim Bayne’s notion of one mind-one body in split-brain patients. Another is that of two minds-one body supported by Roland Puccetti and Roger Sperry. And last is that it is indeterminate as to how many minds exist in one body, supported by Thomas Nagel. Elizabeth Schechter has found a middle ground that supports Bayne’s ideas, and that does not disprove him, by making a connection between the experiences and the unities that Bayne concluded.
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There is a specific type of consciousness that Bayne is very interested in, phenomenal consciousness (Bayne 2008, 4). Phenomenal consciousness uses the understanding of phenomenal unity, what it is like to be in the conscious state. Behavioral disunity does not equal phenomenal disunity, but it is on the path to phenomenal disunity. Bayne argues that split-brain consciousness was often restricted, in the experiments, to the language utilizing left hemisphere, which is not the case (Bayne 2008, 6). Both hemispheres are able to do each other’s job after a period of time and practice. There have been cases where this has happened to the patients, and there are even some who have only one hemisphere. The ‘key-ring’ experiment is unconvincing because it is distinguishing two different experiences from only one major experience and it is not possible (Bayne 2008, 7). This is to say that the mind cannot have two different experiences of the same object. Bayne is trying to explain the way the experiments are formed in order to manipulate the mind into doing an abnormal activity. The lack of everyday normal testing area leads to these rare extremities found in the research of split-brain …show more content…
This is known as the one mind-one body hypothesis. Bayne suggests that the experiments show that there are two different kinds of disunities (Bayne 2008, 3). These disunities explain what happens in specific cases of split-brain surgeries. The disunities are behavioral and representational, behavioral being when the patient, of a spilt-brain surgery, cannot verbally report the images that are visually projected to the right eye (Bayne 2008, 3). This is the outcome of some of the experiments explained in the previous paragraphs. It ties with the disunity that Bayne explained in his research of the patients. The representational disunity is when there is a lack of integration between the content of a specific conscious states (Bayne 2008, 4). To clarify this, it means that the consciousness is not able to process the things being represented in a unified state in the mind, and there are different ideas about the subject. This type of disunity is present in the isolated experiments, but not the everyday life that the patients
There is a specific type of consciousness that Bayne is very interested in, phenomenal consciousness (Bayne 2008, 4). Phenomenal consciousness uses the understanding of phenomenal unity, what it is like to be in the conscious state. Behavioral disunity does not equal phenomenal disunity, but it is on the path to phenomenal disunity. Bayne argues that split-brain consciousness was often restricted, in the experiments, to the language utilizing left hemisphere, which is not the case (Bayne 2008, 6). Both hemispheres are able to do each other’s job after a period of time and practice. There have been cases where this has happened to the patients, and there are even some who have only one hemisphere. The ‘key-ring’ experiment is unconvincing because it is distinguishing two different experiences from only one major experience and it is not possible (Bayne 2008, 7). This is to say that the mind cannot have two different experiences of the same object. Bayne is trying to explain the way the experiments are formed in order to manipulate the mind into doing an abnormal activity. The lack of everyday normal testing area leads to these rare extremities found in the research of split-brain …show more content…
This is known as the one mind-one body hypothesis. Bayne suggests that the experiments show that there are two different kinds of disunities (Bayne 2008, 3). These disunities explain what happens in specific cases of split-brain surgeries. The disunities are behavioral and representational, behavioral being when the patient, of a spilt-brain surgery, cannot verbally report the images that are visually projected to the right eye (Bayne 2008, 3). This is the outcome of some of the experiments explained in the previous paragraphs. It ties with the disunity that Bayne explained in his research of the patients. The representational disunity is when there is a lack of integration between the content of a specific conscious states (Bayne 2008, 4). To clarify this, it means that the consciousness is not able to process the things being represented in a unified state in the mind, and there are different ideas about the subject. This type of disunity is present in the isolated experiments, but not the everyday life that the patients