However, it was just not the focus of concern for them. After the attack, Eisenhower called this move a calculated risk. He mentioned he was not anticipating this offensive attack from Germans and was expecting a defence in the North (Barth, 1993). Alternative Courses of Action The original intent was to remain in the Ardennes for possible defence and recovery after the attack of Normandy. However, the Allied commanders started focusing on planning an offensive attack on Germany from the North and South. Though the battle was unavoidable, the Allied commanders could have strengthened their defence in the Ardennes and kept a reserve for potential defensive attacks once they identified the risk of a thin defence. Furthermore, the reinforming of forces and resources could have prevented the early setback the Allied faced during the battle. Moreover, improving the collection and analysis of data would have helped the Allies understand enemy capabilities (Rosenbaum, 1999). Finally, alternative courses of action, such as the allocation of resources, in-depth intelligence, and strategic decision-making, could have helped mitigate or prevent the overall impact of the
However, it was just not the focus of concern for them. After the attack, Eisenhower called this move a calculated risk. He mentioned he was not anticipating this offensive attack from Germans and was expecting a defence in the North (Barth, 1993). Alternative Courses of Action The original intent was to remain in the Ardennes for possible defence and recovery after the attack of Normandy. However, the Allied commanders started focusing on planning an offensive attack on Germany from the North and South. Though the battle was unavoidable, the Allied commanders could have strengthened their defence in the Ardennes and kept a reserve for potential defensive attacks once they identified the risk of a thin defence. Furthermore, the reinforming of forces and resources could have prevented the early setback the Allied faced during the battle. Moreover, improving the collection and analysis of data would have helped the Allies understand enemy capabilities (Rosenbaum, 1999). Finally, alternative courses of action, such as the allocation of resources, in-depth intelligence, and strategic decision-making, could have helped mitigate or prevent the overall impact of the