Ayer's Moral Judgment Relativism

As you walk into a house you are confronted by one person who believes that “It’s wrong for a host not to offer a gift (beyond refreshments) to a visitor,” and another who believes that “No! It’s not wrong for a host not to offer a gift (beyond refreshments) to a visitor.” From an individual who has studied Harman’s belief in “moral judgement relativism,” and Ayer’s “expressivism,” it is important we understand why both philosophers’ views cannot make sense of this exchange. For context, Gilbert Harman’s belief in “moral judgement relativism,” explains that all moral judgements make implicit reference to the speaker, some other person, some other group, or another set of moral standards. An instance of this concept may be visible through moral …show more content…
One version suggests moral judgements are always implicitly egocentric. Harman acknowledges that moral judgement relativism make implicit reference to the speaker and conflicting moral judgements do not actually conflict if they are made by different speakers. Thus, this given scenario between two cultures is not an ‘egotistic’ exchange and does not guarantee the truth. It is obvious that, “It’s wrong to not give a gift,” and “No, it’s not wrong to not give a gift,” is merely not enough to establish the truth of this specific form of moral judgement relativism. In another version of moral judgement relativism, Harman writes that moral judgements make sense (either true or false) only in relation to one or another set of moral demands. Specifically, “some thing can be right in relation to one morality and not right in relation to another” …show more content…
For in this scenario, if person in culture one maintains that it’s wrong for a host to not offer a gift; and if culture two maintains that, no, it is wrong for a host not to offer a gift; they are not disagreeing with each other. Culture one is saying that if this individual were normal, impartial, and fully informed, they would feel obligated not to offer a gift in certain circumstances. Culture two, if normal, impartial, and fully informed, would not feel obligated to say it’s wrong from a host to give a gift in those circumstances. While it is plausible that culture one would feel obligated to agree for the host to give a gift and culture two the same. However, it is implausible that culture one and culture two do not