Pursuant to s51 (xxxvii), States are able to refer concurrent or residual powers to the Commonwealth. For the majority of the 20th century referrals of power were rare and did not lead to major federal imbalance, as states were reluctant to refer powers due to the ‘centralising tendencies’ of the Commonwealth . Still, the states are reluctant to refer any principal authorities, such as Law and Order or Health, only powers that are too expensive for the States to maintain . For example in 1997, the South Australian and Tasmanian governments transferred ownership and control of their country railway systems to the commonwealth . Additionally, there is ‘unchallenged legislation, in which the Commonwealth legislates ultra vires and there is no challenge from the states . As the High Court cannot declare it invalid unless a party disputes it, and since the only parties involved are the states and the Commonwealth, the legislation remains in force. Examples include the setting up of the CSIRO, the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme, and the Uniform Gun laws 1997 . This informal way to alter the constitution has had very little impact on Federal-State relations: the States are very unlikely to leave unchallenged or pass legislation that limits their own power. Fundamentally, these minor powers are entirely suitable as legal ways of changing the operation of the constitution …show more content…
Deciding in favour of the Commonwealth, the High Court upheld a law that permits the Federal Parliament to control virtually the whole body of workplace relations law , authorizing legislation with respect to traditional State concurrent powers such as corporatized bodies in the fields of education, health care and energy amongst others . The result is the continuation of patchwork legislative coverage that cannot totally cover an area without State co-operation . Thus it does not ‘improve’ federalism by reallocating powers. Rather, it further threatens Australia’s fragile Federal Balance by demanding sustained duplication while removing the incentive for either the Commonwealth or the States to co-operate . Nevertheless, in a great many contexts, the question from the Commonwealth’s point of view no longer would be whether it had legislative power to approach a particular object, but rather whether it chose to exercise the enormously elastic competence conferred upon it by the corporations power. The potential of these realities would be to usher in a period of ‘opportunistic federalism’ , under which the Commonwealth would be free to cherry-pick those areas of