Again marking the potential acceleration of sectarian violence “to genocidal dimensions” as a primary threat, Kissinger also takes pains to reframe the continuing American military commitment as “a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,” demonstrating a precise awareness of Rose’s directive to view armed intervention as a means to achieving an ultimate political end. Crucially, he directly addresses critics who tout pure diplomacy as a feasible alternative, suggesting that “it is not possible to jettison the military instrument” because “the attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy lacking incentives.” While one could quibble with this maxim as a general rule, Kissinger’s analysis seems to hold true in this particular circumstance. Pre-surge and pre-Sunni Awakening, the existential threat that the militias presented to Maliki’s government implies that American military assistance afforded us enormous leverage over governing authorities – a position that would surely be usurped by Iran if our forces withdrew at that moment. Straddling the pre-and-post-surge era, Kissinger’s article successfully presents both security and politics as powerful motives for ongoing military intervention. At this phase, the two objectives were more intimately intertwined than ever before, and the role of military might in addressing the former created an incentive structure that may have allowed us, had we taken full advantage of it, to influence the latter – bringing Iraq that much closer to becoming a “competent political
Again marking the potential acceleration of sectarian violence “to genocidal dimensions” as a primary threat, Kissinger also takes pains to reframe the continuing American military commitment as “a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region,” demonstrating a precise awareness of Rose’s directive to view armed intervention as a means to achieving an ultimate political end. Crucially, he directly addresses critics who tout pure diplomacy as a feasible alternative, suggesting that “it is not possible to jettison the military instrument” because “the attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy lacking incentives.” While one could quibble with this maxim as a general rule, Kissinger’s analysis seems to hold true in this particular circumstance. Pre-surge and pre-Sunni Awakening, the existential threat that the militias presented to Maliki’s government implies that American military assistance afforded us enormous leverage over governing authorities – a position that would surely be usurped by Iran if our forces withdrew at that moment. Straddling the pre-and-post-surge era, Kissinger’s article successfully presents both security and politics as powerful motives for ongoing military intervention. At this phase, the two objectives were more intimately intertwined than ever before, and the role of military might in addressing the former created an incentive structure that may have allowed us, had we taken full advantage of it, to influence the latter – bringing Iraq that much closer to becoming a “competent political