In the essay “Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International Community?” Dominique Maritz argues that America did not respond to the genocide in Rwanda because there were no national interests at risk when deciding whether or not to intervene (Maritz). Adding to this statement, in “U.S. Examines Way to Assist Rwanda Without Troops,” Paul Lewis informs the public of the Clinton administration’s decision of taking a more ‘diplomatic’ approach towards communication with the Rwandan government by not sending in additional armed troops to the ‘civil war’ (P Lewis A1). After taking into account the information that the administration possessed, this accentuates the idea that the U.S. government wanted to have as little to do as possible with this genocide. While a diplomatic approach is not inadequate in practice, the situation had already proved to escalate past the point of negotiation. Maritz then goes into explaining the U.S.’ fear of returning to Africa after the national embarrassment in Somalia, “Black Hawk Down” (Maritz). The fear of repeat embarrassment haunts the U.S. government, which weighed their international policies down, influencing their decisions to be against meddling in other countries affairs. This reason is quite justified as a repeat offense may render the U.S. administration incompetent and weak to spectators, which …show more content…
As morality cannot be condensed on a finite plane, ideals and their end goals differ from person to person. In the essay “Bystanders to Genocide,” Samantha Power is livid at the fact that the United States had an incredible amount of opportunities to intervene in Rwanda, yet the administration decided not to because it was not in the U.S.’s best interests to intervene (Power). Power likely believes that every life should be cherished and should be safeguarded no matter what. Power suggests that when someone is endangered, the immediate reaction should be to help them for the simple preservation of man. On the other hand, in “Humanitarian Hazard: Revisiting Doctrines of Intervention,” Alan J. Kuperman argues that intervention and the possibility of intervention by countries with a selfless desire to help lesser developed groups in danger can cause more trouble than its’ worth (Kuperman 93). In making this comment, Kuperman argues that the outcome of intervention is not always set in stone. He probably considers that there may be outcomes that fan fire to the flame and worsen an already dire situation. This could mean that Kuperman believes the immediate reaction may not always be the rational decision. While both arguments are valid, it should be noted that not every person can be saved, as it is impossible to be everywhere at