Introduction
The constitutional rights of individuals are sufficiently balanced against the importance of intelligence investigations under FISA. However, there is definitely room for transparency, and greater oversight.
While the potential for abuse under FISA is considerable, the potential is mitigated by severe consequences, including prison time, for failing to follow FISA restrictions. The argument exists in legal circles that the U.S. government could accomplish the same degree of protection and threat mitigation with other avenues and approaches to the terrorism and international crime problem set (source).
Further, opponents of FISA have drawn attention to the idiosyncratic approval rate of FISA warrants. Between 1979 and 2012, agencies …show more content…
Post-WWII, the FBI argued that it could engage in surveillance sans authorization, so long as the Bureau determined that the “national interest” justified the surveillance. A notorious example of federal overreach was the FBI’s COINTELPRO operation, which suppressed domestic political dissent in the name of national security. The operation was uncovered, through the Freedom of Information Act, by reporter Carl Stern in 1973. The concept that law enforcement has the right to do “whatever it takes” in the interest of national security has historically been rife for abuse, and should be curtailed at every …show more content…
The targeted entity must be a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power; and the targeted communications must relate to “the ability of the United States to protect against” said foreign power’s efforts to engage in terrorism, attack, or clandestine intelligence activities. If the investigation concerns a U.S. person, the information sought by a FISA warrant must be necessary to prevent an act of terrorism, act of espionage, or attack.
FISA remediates the issues arising from Berger v. New York by requiring agents to:
(1) identify the individuals to be monitored and get court approval for a wiretap or interception of communications;
(2) specify the facilities to be surveilled, and show probable cause that those facilities would be used by the target;
The constitutional rights of individuals are sufficiently balanced against the importance of intelligence investigations under FISA. However, there is definitely room for transparency, and greater oversight.
While the potential for abuse under FISA is considerable, the potential is mitigated by severe consequences, including prison time, for failing to follow FISA restrictions. The argument exists in legal circles that the U.S. government could accomplish the same degree of protection and threat mitigation with other avenues and approaches to the terrorism and international crime problem set (source).
Further, opponents of FISA have drawn attention to the idiosyncratic approval rate of FISA warrants. Between 1979 and 2012, agencies …show more content…
Post-WWII, the FBI argued that it could engage in surveillance sans authorization, so long as the Bureau determined that the “national interest” justified the surveillance. A notorious example of federal overreach was the FBI’s COINTELPRO operation, which suppressed domestic political dissent in the name of national security. The operation was uncovered, through the Freedom of Information Act, by reporter Carl Stern in 1973. The concept that law enforcement has the right to do “whatever it takes” in the interest of national security has historically been rife for abuse, and should be curtailed at every …show more content…
The targeted entity must be a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power; and the targeted communications must relate to “the ability of the United States to protect against” said foreign power’s efforts to engage in terrorism, attack, or clandestine intelligence activities. If the investigation concerns a U.S. person, the information sought by a FISA warrant must be necessary to prevent an act of terrorism, act of espionage, or attack.
FISA remediates the issues arising from Berger v. New York by requiring agents to:
(1) identify the individuals to be monitored and get court approval for a wiretap or interception of communications;
(2) specify the facilities to be surveilled, and show probable cause that those facilities would be used by the target;