2.2 Emotional Retaliation
On a more emotional level, Truman may have hoped to wreak vengeance on the Japanese for atrocities in China and other countries, as well as against Allied prisoner-of-war; a way of retribution for Japans history of barbarianism and inhumane military acts. These actions brought much fury amongst American and certainly played a role in the decision to drop the bomb. Dropping the bomb presented a dramatic way to bring closure to anger, resentment and bitter memories. Following Hiroshima, Truman stated, “they (Japan) have been repaid many fold” . With public feeling high against the Japanese, American leaders were “eager to crush the enemy” .
2.3 Post war diplomacy
However, despite the emotional intensity of the post-war …show more content…
The decision to drop the atomic bomb was a complex one. There were many reasons for using the atomic bomb, some of which could be treated as specious or bloody-minded. There were also alternatives that could have been effective in prompting a Japanese surrender. Allowing the Japanese to retain their emperor as head of state was one relatively important concession from a pragmatic perspective, but of great symbolic significance to a people willing to wage war for their symbols and traditions. Such gestures to modify unconditional surrender, could have been pivotal to preventing the loss of both U.S. lives together with over 100,000 Japanese residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the suffers many would endure from cancers caused by radiation. But given that in the weeks before the deployment of Colonel Tibbs and the Enola Gay, and the other units of the USAF, the most important consideration was pre-empting Soviet involvement in an invasion. Hasegawa suggests, maybe the decisive factor was having the engagement of the Soviet Union, and not the dropping of the two bombs. But if one discounts the negative ramifications of Soviet assistance, especially in Russian incursions were limited to specific regions of Japan, there may have been a viable alternative. J.S. Walker argues, “a combination of B-29 raids with conventional bombs, the blockade, the Soviet invasion, and perhaps a moderation of unconditional surrender policy would have ended the war without an invasion and without the use of atomic bombs.” A single alternative alone may not have produced a surrender, however it seems likely that with a combination the war would have ended by the end of the year. Regardless, Truman’s decision met with rapid success, with the Japanese proffering unconditional surrender days after the bombing of Nagasaki, bringing an end to World War
On a more emotional level, Truman may have hoped to wreak vengeance on the Japanese for atrocities in China and other countries, as well as against Allied prisoner-of-war; a way of retribution for Japans history of barbarianism and inhumane military acts. These actions brought much fury amongst American and certainly played a role in the decision to drop the bomb. Dropping the bomb presented a dramatic way to bring closure to anger, resentment and bitter memories. Following Hiroshima, Truman stated, “they (Japan) have been repaid many fold” . With public feeling high against the Japanese, American leaders were “eager to crush the enemy” .
2.3 Post war diplomacy
However, despite the emotional intensity of the post-war …show more content…
The decision to drop the atomic bomb was a complex one. There were many reasons for using the atomic bomb, some of which could be treated as specious or bloody-minded. There were also alternatives that could have been effective in prompting a Japanese surrender. Allowing the Japanese to retain their emperor as head of state was one relatively important concession from a pragmatic perspective, but of great symbolic significance to a people willing to wage war for their symbols and traditions. Such gestures to modify unconditional surrender, could have been pivotal to preventing the loss of both U.S. lives together with over 100,000 Japanese residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the suffers many would endure from cancers caused by radiation. But given that in the weeks before the deployment of Colonel Tibbs and the Enola Gay, and the other units of the USAF, the most important consideration was pre-empting Soviet involvement in an invasion. Hasegawa suggests, maybe the decisive factor was having the engagement of the Soviet Union, and not the dropping of the two bombs. But if one discounts the negative ramifications of Soviet assistance, especially in Russian incursions were limited to specific regions of Japan, there may have been a viable alternative. J.S. Walker argues, “a combination of B-29 raids with conventional bombs, the blockade, the Soviet invasion, and perhaps a moderation of unconditional surrender policy would have ended the war without an invasion and without the use of atomic bombs.” A single alternative alone may not have produced a surrender, however it seems likely that with a combination the war would have ended by the end of the year. Regardless, Truman’s decision met with rapid success, with the Japanese proffering unconditional surrender days after the bombing of Nagasaki, bringing an end to World War