Avicenna in his major work Kitab Al-Najat argues that the human soul is not material. He argues that the rational faculty, namely the soul, does not know through physical organ. In this sense, he can prove that the soul is not inhered in the material body, therefore indicating that the soul is immaterial.
Avicenna argued in Kitab Al-Najat that “for there is no organ between the rational faculty and itself, nor does one intervene between it and its organ or between it and the fact that it knows”. (Avicenna, 51) As in his previous argument and experience, the rational faculty has direct access to the knowledge of itself without any intermediary. To exhaust all the possibility resided in rational faculty’s knowledge through organ, he further discusses …show more content…
Since the organ in this case became the receiver of all other things, it should distinguish across the matters, but restricted by the form of organ, the matters of organ is unable to recognize the circumstance other than itself. The generic and specific difference cannot be evaluated because the one form would allow only access to some particular matter. This exclusion violated the rational faculty’s property of having infinite access to all. Therefore, this possibility is rejected.
The possibility that the rational faculty’s knowledge of its organ came from some other intelligible form differed from the form of organ is also refuted. The intelligible form partakes in the object to acquire the knowledge of the object. However, the intelligible form is not the form of the organ, because the form only abstracted the essence of the organ, while overlooked the substance constructing the organ. In this sense, he claimed that “sense perceives the external object and not itself, nor its organ, nor its act of perception”. (Avicenna, 52) In this sense, the rational faculty does not know through …show more content…
I agreed that the first possibility should be rejected. In that case, the rational faculty has the knowledge of the form of the organ. However, the observation made by the organ is not reflected on the form of the organ, since the form is commonly defined as the perfect state of matter. Hence, the information received by the organ cannot be conducted through the form that is acquired by the faculty. No new knowledge would be received by the rational faculty, so we cannot claim the faculty know through a organ. I can appreciate the idea of percipient being unable to perceive the detecting organ, but not entire agree with the argument produced for the second possibility. An intelligible form different in kind from the form organ can reach out to the form of organ.
Followed from Avicenna’s idea of blindness regarding the detecting organ, on the bridge built above, the soul can access the form of the organ. Therefore, the soul can realize the existence of the organ due to the existence of its form. The soul still cannot perceive
Avicenna argued in Kitab Al-Najat that “for there is no organ between the rational faculty and itself, nor does one intervene between it and its organ or between it and the fact that it knows”. (Avicenna, 51) As in his previous argument and experience, the rational faculty has direct access to the knowledge of itself without any intermediary. To exhaust all the possibility resided in rational faculty’s knowledge through organ, he further discusses …show more content…
Since the organ in this case became the receiver of all other things, it should distinguish across the matters, but restricted by the form of organ, the matters of organ is unable to recognize the circumstance other than itself. The generic and specific difference cannot be evaluated because the one form would allow only access to some particular matter. This exclusion violated the rational faculty’s property of having infinite access to all. Therefore, this possibility is rejected.
The possibility that the rational faculty’s knowledge of its organ came from some other intelligible form differed from the form of organ is also refuted. The intelligible form partakes in the object to acquire the knowledge of the object. However, the intelligible form is not the form of the organ, because the form only abstracted the essence of the organ, while overlooked the substance constructing the organ. In this sense, he claimed that “sense perceives the external object and not itself, nor its organ, nor its act of perception”. (Avicenna, 52) In this sense, the rational faculty does not know through …show more content…
I agreed that the first possibility should be rejected. In that case, the rational faculty has the knowledge of the form of the organ. However, the observation made by the organ is not reflected on the form of the organ, since the form is commonly defined as the perfect state of matter. Hence, the information received by the organ cannot be conducted through the form that is acquired by the faculty. No new knowledge would be received by the rational faculty, so we cannot claim the faculty know through a organ. I can appreciate the idea of percipient being unable to perceive the detecting organ, but not entire agree with the argument produced for the second possibility. An intelligible form different in kind from the form organ can reach out to the form of organ.
Followed from Avicenna’s idea of blindness regarding the detecting organ, on the bridge built above, the soul can access the form of the organ. Therefore, the soul can realize the existence of the organ due to the existence of its form. The soul still cannot perceive