As Minister of Defence from 1968 to 1978 P.W. Botha was at the center of this ideology, promoting a “total strategy” that included the reorientation of political, economic, military, and social institutions against the supposed communist menace. Additionally, Botha and other members in leadership saw neighboring countries as the frontline against communism, using the pretext of national security to continuously intervene in other states’ affairs. According to Mitchell Reiss, an American diplomat, the ex-head of South African military intelligence General H. D. E. V. du Toit questioned the logic of the communist hysteria, saying, “I don’t think we ever thought it was feasible for anyone to attack us from the north.” Nevertheless, the bunker mentality of South African political and military leaders allowed secret military programs to flourish. Botha and the military gained increasing control of the apartheid apparatus and created a self-reinforcing cycle where disturbances, which were often caused by the state’s severe tactics, were used as excuses to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological …show more content…
He began interacting with high-ranking military officials and received the award of the Order of the Southern Cross for his efforts. The SADF High Command identified Basson as the ideal candidate for the forthcoming chemical and weapons program. In this neurotic environment of paranoia, Wouter Basson and his intellectual expertise matched with the demand for loyal soldiers willing to utilize extreme measures to protect the regime. The program was solely administered by the SADF under the Surgeon-General’s office and operated in some form until the ANC took over government in 1995. A management committee called the Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC) oversaw the program and included the Chief of the SADF, the Surgeon-General, and other top military officials. Basson’s first overseas mission for the program was to determine how other countries conducted their covert chemical and biological weapons programs. He returned in 1981 and reported that other countries used front corporations to develop their programs. Although his findings were often partially or completely untrue, particularly when related to the American and Soviet programs, Basson had identified important mechanisms to set up the fledgling