These are indeed valid concerns, in that if a representative loses concern for his electors then the people would no longer have adequate representation and their interests would be lost in Congress. To this Publius responds that the citizens themselves elect the representatives (Federalist #53, p. 349) and that the representatives “can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends” (Federalist #53, p. 350). In the first statement Publius essentially tells the skeptics to elect a good representative since they, the people, elect him to office. Publius goes on to say that just because representatives make the rules does not mean that they will have immunity. Representatives shall be held to the laws they create, which is one incentive to stay true to their electors.
These are indeed valid concerns, in that if a representative loses concern for his electors then the people would no longer have adequate representation and their interests would be lost in Congress. To this Publius responds that the citizens themselves elect the representatives (Federalist #53, p. 349) and that the representatives “can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends” (Federalist #53, p. 350). In the first statement Publius essentially tells the skeptics to elect a good representative since they, the people, elect him to office. Publius goes on to say that just because representatives make the rules does not mean that they will have immunity. Representatives shall be held to the laws they create, which is one incentive to stay true to their electors.