This course has examined different interpretations of the term ‘scientific laws’ and how these laws apply in separate scientific fields. For example, Carl Hempel, a physicist defines laws as “universal, conditional statements” neither finite in scope or alluding to specific objects, and “using only qualitative predicates” (Sept 14th handout). Hempel’s understanding of scientific law is the traditional and well-accepted definition. On the other hand, Sandra Mitchell, interested in biology, has a looser conception of scientific laws and advocates for examining laws as varying degrees of contingency. Using Andrea Woody and Marc Lange articles, this essay proposes the notion of scientific laws as models, highlights the difference between hypotheses
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In her article, “Telltale Signs,” Andrea Woody rarely mentions what separates a law from a hypothesis. Instead, she advocates that philosophers of science should be more concerned with the explanatory power of the examined theory because it constitutes a scientific law’s usefulness (16). She views laws as general models which highlight different types of relationships in a described element’s properties. Using chemistry’s ideal gas law as her first example, Woody argues against traditional conceptions of scientific law by declaring that a law is not solely legitimatized because of its empirically accurate description (21). She highlights in her example that although ideal gases do not physically exist, the ideal gas law’s value is in its approximate descriptions, because it helps determine a degree of accuracy (19). Woody also accentuates that a law’s value and explanatory power is also attributed to the intricate interconnections it highlights between different realms, rather than through derivations— the traditional conception of law’s explanatory power …show more content…
Lange highlights theories, such as the MacArthur-Wilson equilibrium theory, and claims that “all [these theories] are idealizations that are reliable (for certain purposes), despite including only the “greater causes,” and that would still have been reliable under a range of counterfactual suppositions that includes some violations of the laws of fundamental physics” (500). Similar to Woody, Lange understands that the traditional physic-linked conception of laws is too restrictive and that a macro, encompassing model, provides significant explanatorily information (500). As illustrated in Woody’s periodic table example, Lange also highlights that one does not have to possess all the details to make sense of an occurrence or information. At times, compressing details exposes broader underlying connections. He understands scientific laws as norms of reasoning, as opposed to absolute truths
In her article, “Telltale Signs,” Andrea Woody rarely mentions what separates a law from a hypothesis. Instead, she advocates that philosophers of science should be more concerned with the explanatory power of the examined theory because it constitutes a scientific law’s usefulness (16). She views laws as general models which highlight different types of relationships in a described element’s properties. Using chemistry’s ideal gas law as her first example, Woody argues against traditional conceptions of scientific law by declaring that a law is not solely legitimatized because of its empirically accurate description (21). She highlights in her example that although ideal gases do not physically exist, the ideal gas law’s value is in its approximate descriptions, because it helps determine a degree of accuracy (19). Woody also accentuates that a law’s value and explanatory power is also attributed to the intricate interconnections it highlights between different realms, rather than through derivations— the traditional conception of law’s explanatory power …show more content…
Lange highlights theories, such as the MacArthur-Wilson equilibrium theory, and claims that “all [these theories] are idealizations that are reliable (for certain purposes), despite including only the “greater causes,” and that would still have been reliable under a range of counterfactual suppositions that includes some violations of the laws of fundamental physics” (500). Similar to Woody, Lange understands that the traditional physic-linked conception of laws is too restrictive and that a macro, encompassing model, provides significant explanatorily information (500). As illustrated in Woody’s periodic table example, Lange also highlights that one does not have to possess all the details to make sense of an occurrence or information. At times, compressing details exposes broader underlying connections. He understands scientific laws as norms of reasoning, as opposed to absolute truths