Both having a strict communist past, Russia and China can be considered Comrades. While the two share similar economic policies and political ideals, they have gone on separate paths since the late 20th century, some changes being more capitalism and others not. Government influence is in essentially all markets, and the fiscal policies set by Russia and China and patron-clientelism are no exception. Fiscal policies dictate how much the government spends and how much it taxes. A key difference between a capitalist state and a communist state is that a communist state holds more control over its economy through more government spending and taxation. China’s current economy relies on exports and construction, both areas that the government has
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With corruption in China functioning through a social lubricant called Guanxi, meaning “relationship,” and corruption in Russia functioning through a slightly different mode using patron-clientelism to funnel public funds into private hands. China’s Guanxi is not only limited to government-individual relationships. It can also be between businessmen and is present in all forms of business in all scales in China. It is defined as a social lubricant that facilitates business transactions and allows business decisions to be made based on favorable personal relationships with business partners or political officers. The general case of patron-clientelism is the bribing of government officials to ignore policies and laws set by the state. An example is the Xiao Tian, a former member of China’s Olympic committee. Xiao Tian was found to have accepted bribes to disrupt official Olympic games as well as illegally placing his wife in a job. The disrupted games may have benefited a client and a client also aided Xiao Tian to illegally place his wife in a new job. Such actions are favors traded between the patron/Xiao Tian and the client through guanxi. Corruption in Russia comes most often in the form of corporatism; State sanctioned private enterprises that have relations to State owned enterprises that allow private individuals to siphon from public funds. An example of this is yet another Olympics related scandal. The company that manufactured the 16,000, $400 torches for the Sochi Olympics “sold” them to the Russian government for 6.4 million dollars; the 6.4 million paid for the cheap cigarette lighters and metal frames that make up the Olympic torches. This is an example of the private company producing such torches, Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant in this case, overcharging and benefiting from the public’s tax money through political ties.
With corruption in China functioning through a social lubricant called Guanxi, meaning “relationship,” and corruption in Russia functioning through a slightly different mode using patron-clientelism to funnel public funds into private hands. China’s Guanxi is not only limited to government-individual relationships. It can also be between businessmen and is present in all forms of business in all scales in China. It is defined as a social lubricant that facilitates business transactions and allows business decisions to be made based on favorable personal relationships with business partners or political officers. The general case of patron-clientelism is the bribing of government officials to ignore policies and laws set by the state. An example is the Xiao Tian, a former member of China’s Olympic committee. Xiao Tian was found to have accepted bribes to disrupt official Olympic games as well as illegally placing his wife in a job. The disrupted games may have benefited a client and a client also aided Xiao Tian to illegally place his wife in a new job. Such actions are favors traded between the patron/Xiao Tian and the client through guanxi. Corruption in Russia comes most often in the form of corporatism; State sanctioned private enterprises that have relations to State owned enterprises that allow private individuals to siphon from public funds. An example of this is yet another Olympics related scandal. The company that manufactured the 16,000, $400 torches for the Sochi Olympics “sold” them to the Russian government for 6.4 million dollars; the 6.4 million paid for the cheap cigarette lighters and metal frames that make up the Olympic torches. This is an example of the private company producing such torches, Krasnoyarsk Machine Building Plant in this case, overcharging and benefiting from the public’s tax money through political ties.