Atomic Bomb Decision Analysis

In spite of the general public opinion, the decision by Trumann to drop the Atomic bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima was unnecessary. It was mainly redundant regarding military standpoint. In fact, the view of the America’s leading generals concerning this decision contradicted with that of the politicians’ viewpoint. Perhaps, it will be important to consider that these generals raised their concerns before as well as after the bombing. Among these individuals were the Supreme Commander in charge of the Allied Forces in the Western part of Europe and General Eisenhower. The two expressed their opinion. Their view contradicted with the narrative which the politicians were spreading with regard to the military view. Thus, Truman’s decision was barbaric …show more content…
Most of the military analyst insisted that the state of situation in Japan was already not good and that it was unnecessary to bomb Japan as they would have surrendered after some few days to come. According to Henry L. Stimson the then Secretary of War, the decision that was made to drop atomic bomb was unnecessary (Wainstock, 2010). Stimson said that it was unnecessary as Japan was already on the losing end during the war. He also claimed that it was not right for America to use the weapon that they knew that it would have led to a long-lasting devastation in the world. In fact according to the General Douglas MacArthur, the decision was unnecessary. He proofed that by saying that the battle was to “end sooner than some think,” (Zinn, 2002). It was clear that Japan was already beaten. It is, therefore, a fact that the decision was not justified at …show more content…
Although Truman tried to explain his reasons, it was a fact that the military sector was disappointed with his decision. Perhaps, one will wonder if there was a need of bombing already vulnerable Japanese. It was clear that the war was to end within approximately the next two weeks without Russians joining or the use of atomic bomb. The atomic bomb simply led to the uprising of the cold war and dangerous nuclear terror characterized by the arms race. Americans have never solved the problem up to date. In fact, General Curtis LeMay, who was mainly in charge of the fire-bombing of the two cities, expressed his disappointment with the decision. LeMay said to the reporters that, “the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all,” (Adler and Pouwels, 2014). He justified his statement by saying that the war was to end in the next two weeks without the need to use a disastrous atomic bomb (Adler, 2014). Another military disappointment was expressed by Admiral Chester Nimitz, who was in charge of Pacific Fleet. Nimitz concluded publicly that the atomic bomb played no part in the defeat of the Japanese from a military standpoint. It was, therefore, unnecessary to bomb Hiroshima and