Within chapter ten of Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga creates and shapes the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, which begins with a premise titled “Darwin’s Doubt.” This premise argues that true belief, given the existence of evolution by way of naturalism, is extremely low, if not entirely impossible. Plantinga strengthens this argument by discussing material naturalism (specifically reductive and nonreductive materialism). However, over the course of his argument, he ignores the logical possibility of immaterial naturalism, a theory that I argue changes (and possibly destroys) the validity of the EAN. Thus, within this paper, I will argue that Plantinga’s EAN is incomplete, as he does not adequately respond to the
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To begin, Plantinga describes nonreductive materialism as “content properties (that) are not reducible to NP properties, but are determined by (supervene on) NP properties.” In simpler terms, this roughly translates to the idea that beliefs that are not solely neuro-physiological properties without content, but instead are created due and by these NP structures (such as brain neurons and the connections between these …show more content…
It is important to point out that these virtues, as well as all other actions of the soul, are entirely separate from the brain’s mental processes, which I will expound upon at a later point. As well as forming virtues, the soul also reasons through desire and emotion (such as the desire to learn), and can have beliefs about objects of desire. However, according to Phaedo, the range of activities the soul may complete is far narrower than the range of activities the mind may complete. Though the soul does form desires related to imperceptible things, it will not form bodily desires such as “I am hungry” or “I am cold,” and must stay within the sphere of pure reason. However, within Plato’s Republic, we see a slightly disparate and perhaps, more comprehensive version of Plato’s view of the soul. The Republic asserts that the soul is responsible for the life of the organism, all of its intellectual functions, and, just as we see in Phaedo, all moral and ethical virtues. However, the soul’s scope is enlarged to also include the origin of an organism’s desire to care for other beings, to rule and deliberate, and, if behaving correctly, helps a being achieve eudemonia, or a life well
To begin, Plantinga describes nonreductive materialism as “content properties (that) are not reducible to NP properties, but are determined by (supervene on) NP properties.” In simpler terms, this roughly translates to the idea that beliefs that are not solely neuro-physiological properties without content, but instead are created due and by these NP structures (such as brain neurons and the connections between these …show more content…
It is important to point out that these virtues, as well as all other actions of the soul, are entirely separate from the brain’s mental processes, which I will expound upon at a later point. As well as forming virtues, the soul also reasons through desire and emotion (such as the desire to learn), and can have beliefs about objects of desire. However, according to Phaedo, the range of activities the soul may complete is far narrower than the range of activities the mind may complete. Though the soul does form desires related to imperceptible things, it will not form bodily desires such as “I am hungry” or “I am cold,” and must stay within the sphere of pure reason. However, within Plato’s Republic, we see a slightly disparate and perhaps, more comprehensive version of Plato’s view of the soul. The Republic asserts that the soul is responsible for the life of the organism, all of its intellectual functions, and, just as we see in Phaedo, all moral and ethical virtues. However, the soul’s scope is enlarged to also include the origin of an organism’s desire to care for other beings, to rule and deliberate, and, if behaving correctly, helps a being achieve eudemonia, or a life well