This can be best explained through an investigation of Plato’s view on the soul in the Republic. First, Plato distinguishes between the reasonable and the appetitive parts of the soul. In this, the appetitive part of the soul hosts the many cravings/desires that are necessary to survive and to reproduce as a living being; thus, this part of the soul includes hunger and thirst for nourishment, pleasure and lust for reproduction, among many other appetites (437e-438a). Furthermore, these appetites are desires for certain things without qualification, for example “thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it is in its nature to be for, namely, drink itself (438e).” Rather, it is the rational part of the soul that, through rational calculations, chooses what is best to satisfy the appetites and whether to appease these appetites at all so that the irrational appetitive part of the soul is ordered to reasoned purposes (439d-e). Finally, Plato distinguishes the spirited part from the appetitive part in that the spirited part uses shame and honor rule over the appetitive part of the soul (440b). On the other hand, Plato declares the spirited part of the soul to be different from the rational part, but that this spirited part often aligns itself with the rational part and helps to enforce the just and the good over the appetites (441a). From this, Plato states that a just soul is the one in which rationality rules (and the spirited part helps to enforce the rule) over the appetites (442a-b). This is, as only through reason that the intelligible definition of justice is ascertained and how this knowledge is applied to human society: following the principle of “doing and sticking to one’s own
This can be best explained through an investigation of Plato’s view on the soul in the Republic. First, Plato distinguishes between the reasonable and the appetitive parts of the soul. In this, the appetitive part of the soul hosts the many cravings/desires that are necessary to survive and to reproduce as a living being; thus, this part of the soul includes hunger and thirst for nourishment, pleasure and lust for reproduction, among many other appetites (437e-438a). Furthermore, these appetites are desires for certain things without qualification, for example “thirst itself will never be for anything other than what it is in its nature to be for, namely, drink itself (438e).” Rather, it is the rational part of the soul that, through rational calculations, chooses what is best to satisfy the appetites and whether to appease these appetites at all so that the irrational appetitive part of the soul is ordered to reasoned purposes (439d-e). Finally, Plato distinguishes the spirited part from the appetitive part in that the spirited part uses shame and honor rule over the appetitive part of the soul (440b). On the other hand, Plato declares the spirited part of the soul to be different from the rational part, but that this spirited part often aligns itself with the rational part and helps to enforce the just and the good over the appetites (441a). From this, Plato states that a just soul is the one in which rationality rules (and the spirited part helps to enforce the rule) over the appetites (442a-b). This is, as only through reason that the intelligible definition of justice is ascertained and how this knowledge is applied to human society: following the principle of “doing and sticking to one’s own