Epistemic Approach To Role Oughts Essay

Feldman’s response seems inherently strange to me, and I believe the number of relevant differences between role oughts and epistemic oughts make it so that role ought cannot possibly serve as a good model for epistemic oughts. I will explain each of my objections to Feldman’s move to role oughts in turn. The first noticeable difference between role oughts and epistemic oughts is that role oughts seem to be purely pragmatic. It is practically beneficial to fulfill a role well. For example, if I were a teacher, I would benefit from explaining things well, and so would my students. Similarly, it is pragmatic for me to be a good cyclist. Presumably, I desire to be a good cyclist and it is safer both for me and for others if I cycle well. Epistemic …show more content…
These would be roles that we do not adopt voluntarily. The roles of breather and drinker would be examples of these. They are inescapable and involuntarily in the same way that the role of believer is. Consider, for example, the role of breather. We all have to breathe and are thus in the role of breather, even if we did not voluntarily choose to be. Feldman would presumably suggest that there is a proper way to breathe well. We ought to breathe evenly, in through the nose, and out through the mouth, for example.
But consider this situation: a baby is born with a condition that does not allow him to breathe properly on his own. Presumably, it would be absurd for us to say that this baby still ought to breathe well. Feldman would likely agree that this baby is exempt from his obligation as breather. The baby cannot breathe on his own, and so is relieved of his obligation. But this assumed agreement would go directly in the face of Feldman’s argument: that ought does not imply can. The baby’s obligation to breathe well would disappear precisely because of the principle of ought implies